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JOHN QuiNcy ADAMS REVISITED
GEORGE ANASTAPLO*t

Let us follow the Prophet's counsel: Isaid,Ihave resolvedtokeep
watch over my ways thatImay never sin with my tongue. I haveput
a guard on my mouth. I was silent and was humbled, and I
refrainedevenfrom goodwords.(Psalms 38:2-3) Here the Prophet
indicates that there are times when good words are to be left unsaid
out of esteem for silence. For all the more reason, then, should evil
speech be avoided. Indeed, so important is silence that permission
to speak should seldom be granted even to mature disciples, no
matter how good or holy or constructive their talk, because it is
written: In a flood of words you will not avoid sin (Proverbs 10:
19), and elsewhere, The tongue holds the key to life and death
(Proverbs 18: 21). Speaking and teaching are the master's talk; the
disciple is to be silent and listen.
-The Rule of St. Benedict, chap. 6
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PROLOGUE

I had occasion, some decades ago, to examine the limits of freedom of
speech in the United States by recalling the explosive career of John Quincy
Adams in the House of Representative between 1831 and 1848. That career,
particularly his handling there of the slavery controversy, was examined by
me in a 1971 book, The Constitutionalist:Notes on the FirstAmendment,
which is excerpted in Appendix B of this Collection.
Adams, especially in his responses to slavery-related issues, is revisited
in the essay immediately following this Prologue, "John Quincy Adams and
the Irrationality of Slavery." The exuberance with which Adams conducted
himself in the House of Representatives and also in Supreme Court
litigation in the 1840s can be usefully compared to the restraint, especially
with respect to slavery-related issues, exhibited by him decades before as
Secretary of State and as an aspirant to the Presidency.
A review of Adams's overall career can help us appreciate the effects
of slavery on American politics during the first half of the Nineteenth
Century. That review may also help us see properly race-relations issues of
our own time.
The systematic treatment by Aristotle of the Four Causes is adapted,
somewhat loosely but still usefully, to the selection of Appendices for this
Collection. These Appendices exhibit facets of American constitutionalism.
The principal discussion by Aristotle of the Four Causes can be found in his
Physics and in his Metaphysics, with his understanding of causation
illuminating most of his other works as well, including his ethical and
political studies. (See also Note ix of Appendix D of this Collection.)
The Final Cause is drawn upon in Appendix A of this Collection, with
its introduction to the Preamble to the Constitution. That Preamble,
anticipated in this respect by the Declaration of Independence, records the
ends to which a proper constitutional system may be directed.
The so-called Efficient Cause is drawn upon in Appendix B, with its
somewhat detailed review of how slavery came to be handled in the House
of Representatives in the 1840s. The workings of a constitutional system,
and especially its dependence upon an effective freedom of speech, are
thereby exposed to view, with suggestions made about the manner in which
political power may properly be exercised.
The Material Cause may be glimpsed in Appendix C, with its reminders
of the human material which any political order must take into account. An
understanding of what it means to be human is debated, in effect, in
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controversies that have shaken Americans, such as the slavery controversy
in the Nineteenth Century and the abortion controversy in the Twentieth
Century.
The Formal Cause is drawn upon in Appendix D, with its celebration
the
authoritative guidance, including the forms, upon which
of
constitutionalism and good government depend. There can be seen in that
account an instance of that overlapping of the Final and Formal Causes with
which we are familiar, especially in the political domain. (An overlapping
of the Efficient and Material Causes may also be familiar.)
When the ends of government are neglected, if not even dismissed as
politically naive and as legally irrelevant (as is routinely done these days
with the Declaration ofIndependence and the Preamble to the Constitution),
the tendency of "realists" becomes that of making much more than is
healthy of process, of power, of personal ambition, of chance desires, and
even of "economics." Constitutionalism must then try to mange without its
heart.
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE IRRATIONALITY OF SLAVERY

It is impossible for us to assume these people [African slaves] are
men because if we assumed they were men one would begin to
believe we ourselves were not Christians.
-

Montesquieu'

Michael Daly Hawkins's study of John Quincy Adams and the preCivil War maritime slave trade is quite instructive, not least in describing
how Adams's social circumstances and personal ambitions affected how he
would speak publicly about and act upon his political and constitutional
principles.2 The two most dramatic controversies with respect to that slave

1. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRITOF THE LAWS 250 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller
and
Harold S. Stone trans., 1989). See John Wesley, Thoughts Upon Slavery, in LIBERTY,
.

EQUALITY & MODERN CoNSTnUToNALIsM: A SOURCE BOOK 250

(George Anastaplo ed.,

1999). Compare Alexander H. Stephens, On Slavery and the Bible, id. at 221.
2. See Michael Daly Hawkins, JohnQuincyAdams andtheAntebellum MaritimeSlave
Trade: The Politics ofSlavery and the Slavery of Politics,25 OKLA. CITY UNIv. L. REV. 1
(2000). One could speak also here of the enslavement of the enslavers. (All quotations from
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trade during his career were provoked by litigation about the disposition of
two slave-trade ships seized by the United States Navy in North American
waters-The Antelope in 1820 and The Amistad in 1839.3 During the
Antelope controversy, Adams was the Secretary of State in James Monroe's
administration, counseling the return of the ship and its cargo (including
Africans held as slaves) to its Spanish and Portuguese owners. During the
Amistad controversy, Adams, then a member of the House of
Representatives, served as one of the lawyers arguing in the United States
Supreme Court for the freedom of the slaves who had taken over their ship
and emancipated themselves.4
Judge Hawkins's instructive account is particularly useful for the
student of the career of Abraham Lincoln, for one can see, in Lincoln's
handling of the doctrines and deeds of abolitionists in the 1840s and 1850s,
considerations anticipated by those taken into account by Secretary of State
Adams in the handling of the Antelope matter in the 1820s. The following
passage, the concluding paragraph in the Hawkins account of the Adams
response to the maritime slave-trade challenge, applies substantially to the
later Lincoln response to the abolitionist challenge:
The cases involving the antebellum maritime slave trade serve as
extraordinary studies of the pressures that high profile and
politically sensitive issues can bring to bear on even the most
independent of our institutions and officials. It was the "third rail"
of the politics of its day: touching it meant instant political death to
one's national political ambitions. Avoiding it was the only
politically healthy alternative. In that sense, slavery produced a
political force that enslaved the seekers of national elective office.
As extraordinary an individual as he was, John Quincy Adams was
himself a slave to political forces as long as he harbored ambitions
for higher office. Slavery, and the slave trade that helped support
it, was more than an institution; it represented a combination of the

and references to Judge Hawkins's article are taken by me from the typescript provided me,
not from the final published version. I have numbered his twenty sections, which I will cite
by number and section title.)
3. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66(1825); United States v. The Schooner
Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841). See infra note 47.
4. See John Forsyth, John Quincy Adams (1767-1848), in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONsTITrnoN 20 (1986); Worthington Chauncey Ford, John Quincy Adams,
in 1 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 84 (1928).
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most powerful political, social and economic interests of the day.
Adams described the result of that combination: "[T]he cement of
that common interest produced by slavery is stronger and more
solid than unmingled freedom." Free of the political force of those
"common interests" and answerable only to his neighbors and
admirers back in Quincy, Massachusetts, Adams could [as a
Member of the House of Representatives between 1831 and 1848]
take a more forceful role in the efforts to end slavery. In the end,
his earlier predictions proved correct; it would take a terrible war
to begin to resolve the divisions produced by the contradiction
between America's ideals and its practices.5
Adams, like Lincoln after him, recognized that it could be simply
irresponsible to say publicly, in all situations, whatever one happened to
believe.6
For Adams, as for Lincoln in the next political generation, the
Declaration of Independence was vital. After all, Adams's father had been
critical to both the drafting and the adopting of the Declaration. And in turn,
Adams's son, Charles Francis Adams, argued (like his father in his old age)
that Americans had to choose between slavery and the Declaration of
Independence.7 One can see, from the careers of men such as John Quincy
Adams and Abraham Lincoln, the distorting effects that slavery, and later
race relations, have always had in the United States. The immensity of the
"race problem" in the Western Hemisphere is suggested by this report: "In
the first three and a quarter centuries of European activity in the Americas,
between 1492 and 1820, five times as many Africans went to the New
World as did white Europeans; and even in the next fifty years, until 1870,

5. Hawkins, supra note 2, Section 20 ("The Role of John Quincy Adams"). On
Adams's "more forceful role" in the House of Representatives, see Appendix B of this
Collection.
6. The paths of Adams and Lincoln crossed in the House of Representatives, with
Adams dying during the single term that Lincoln served there. Lincoln was ajunior member
of the Congressional Committee in charge of Adams's funeral. See I ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 450n (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers
University Press 1953).
7. See DONALD B. COLE, MARTIN VAN BURENANDTHE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
415 (1984). See, on John Quincy Adams's son, Washington Chauncey Ford, Charles
FrancisAdams, in DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supranote 4, at 48.
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probably as many blacks were taken to Brazil and Cuba as there were white
men arriving in the continent.""
One is reminded again and again, upon reviewing accounts of modern
slavery and especially of the slave trade, of the chronic irrationalityin
public (as well as in private) life that the accommodations to slavery
(however "understandable") required and led to. This was particularly
evident, as we shall see further on, in the arguments that could be made by
the Government of the United States in its attempts to restore to slavery the
Africans on The Amistad who had presumed to emancipate themselves.
Similarly, questionable accommodations could be seen, a generation earlier,
in the way that John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State and as
prospective President, considered himself obliged to act in the affair of The
Antelope.9
II.
John Quincy Adams had been circumspect, especially with respect to
slavery-related issues, during his service as Secretary of State and then as
President of the United States. His presidential term (1825-1829) is
regarded as unsuccessful, in large part because of the passions aroused
among Andrew Jackson's supporters by the way Adams secured the office
after the presidential contest had to be resolved in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, Adams is widely regarded as perhaps
our greatest Secretary of State.' 0
He figured, while still Secretary of State, that he would need the
support of Southern voters if he was to be elected President in 1824-and
that, it was obvious, required that he not arouse the hostility ofthe South by
openly questioning what Southerners considered their slavery-related
prerogatives under the Constitution of 1787. His caution with respect to
these matters is reflected in how he dealt, in the State Department, with the

8.

HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE,

1840-1870, at 793 (1997). For a contemporary illustration of the distorting effect that race
relations can have, albeit in a minor key, see George Anastaplo, "Racism, " Political
Correctness,and ConstitutionalLaw, 43 S.D. L. REV. 108 (1997).

9. On "governmental insanity," see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, CAMPUS HATE-SPEECH
CODES, NATURAL RIGHT, AND TWENTIETH CENTURY ATRocrnES 49 (1999). See also infra
the text accompanying notes 29, 37.
10. See, e.g., Erick McKitrick, JQA: Forthe Defense, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, April 23,
1998, at 53, 56. Adams is regarded as the principal author of the Monroe Doctrine. See
Forsyth, supra note 4, at 21.
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issues posed by the Antelope matter, urging the course advocated by the
foreign governments concerned: the return of the ship and all of its cargo
to its presumed owners, even though it was suspected that those owners had
planned to violate the law, in effect since 1808, against the importation of
slaves into the United States."
There are ample indications, here and there in Adams's diaries and
other private papers, that he (like his father before him) had a lifelong
antipathy to slavery. But John Quincy Adams's antipathy did not become
generally known until he left the Presidency in 1829. At the root of his
long-time position here were political and constitutional principles
described in this way by an encyclopedist:
Defeated for reelection in 1828, Adams seemed at the end of his
career. In 1829 he wrote the least prudent, if most interesting, of
his many essays and pamphlets, an account of the events leading up
to the convening of the Hartford Convention, implicating many of
New England's most famous men in treason. In writing this long
essay (published posthumously in Documents Relating to New
England Federalism, 1801-1815) he developed a theory of the

Union that constituted the burden of his speeches and public
writings until his death in 1848, and that became the political
gospel of the new Republican Party and its greatest leader,
Abraham Lincoln. 2
The encyclopedia account provides further indications of how Adams
anticipated the doctrines of Lincoln and the Republican Party.
According to Adams, the Constitution was not a compact between
sovereign states but was the organic law of the American nation,
given by the American people to themselves in the exercise of their
inalienable right to consent to the form of government over them.
The state governments derived their existence from the same act of
consent that created the federal government. They did not exist
before the federal government, therefore, and could not have
created it themselves by compact. What is more, the state
11. On the 1808 Slave Trade Provision, in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, see
GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CoNsTrnrUIoNoF 1787: A COMMENTARY 62-63, 72(1989). See
also infra 14, 29.
12. Forsyth, supra note 4, at 21.
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governments, like the federal government, depended decisively on
the truth of those first principles of politics enunciated in the
Declaration of Independence for their own legitimacy.
The Whig theory of the Constitution was politically
provocative. By it slavery was a clear moral evil. Adams, like
Lincoln after him, justified the compromise with slavery as
necessary in the circumstances to the existence of a constitutional
union in America, but Adams vehemently maintained the duty to
prevent the spread of what was at best a necessary evil. While he
advocated a scrupulous care for the legal rights of slavery where it
was established, he insisted that the government of the United
States must always speak as a free state in world affairs. He
believed it to be a duty of the whole nation to set slavery, as
3
Lincoln would later say, on the course of ultimate extinction.
It was in the Congress, for a decade and a half, that the elderly John
Quincy Adams pursued his unrelenting campaign against the slavery
interests, as may be seen in this continuation of the account which has just
been quoted:
This theory guided his words and deeds in the House of
Representatives from 1831 until his death. For fourteen years he
waged an almost single-handed war against the dominant
Jacksonian Democratic majority in the House, a struggle focused
on the gag rule. The gag rule was actually a series of standing rules
adopted at every session of Congress from 1836 on. In its final
form it read: "No petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper
praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia or any
State or Territory, or the slave trade between the States or
Territories in which it now exists, shall be received by this House,
or entertained in any way whatever."' 4
The gag rule was part of a policy followed by the Democratic party
in this period, on the advice of John C. Calhoun, among others,
13. Id.

14. On the Commerce Power and the ability of Congress to regulate the slave trade, see,
e.g., GEORGE ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: ACoNsTrrUTIoNAL BIoGRAPHY 57-58, 296
n.241 (1999).
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never in the least thing to admit the authority of Congress over
slavery. Adams argued that the gag was a patent abrogation of the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of petition. His speeches
against the gag rule became a rallying point for the growing freesoil and abolition movements in the North, though Adams himself
was cautious about endorsing the programs of the radicals. 5
However cautious Adams may have always been about endorsing the
programs of the radical abolitionists, he was anything but that in the way
that he conducted himself during the decade-long controversy about the gag
rule. Indeed, it has been said that Adams was largely responsible for
converting much of the North to an aggressively anti-slavery position.
Lincoln, in distinguishing himself from the abolitionists, even as he made
astute use of them, was far more restrained in his political discourses
throughout his career than Adams was after 1828.6
The encyclopedia article about John Quincy Adams upon which we
have drawn concludes with these observations.
Through a long and varied career, Adams's statesmanship was
guided by the twin principles of liberty and union. As a diplomat
and architect of American foreign policy, Adams played a large
part in the creation of a continental Republic. He believed that the
westward expansion of the country was necessary if the United
States was to minimize foreign interference in its domestic politics.
Yet expansion brought the most powerful internal forces of
disruption of the Union into play and prepared the way for the Civil
17
War.

Such a war was evidently anticipated by him, as well as the possibility that
use of the so-called "war power" might enable the Government of the
United States to take measures against slavery that it might not otherwise
be authorized to consider.1'
15. Forsyth, supra note 4, at 21-22.

16. See Appendix B of this Collection. Also, Lincoln was sensitive to the usefulness of
silence, even though he would not go as far as The Rule of St. Benedict. See the epigraph at
the head of this Collection. See also infra note 33, and the text accompanying infra notes

106 and 107 in Appendix B of this Collection.
17. Forsyth, supra note 4, at 22.
18. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. CRoSsKEY, POLrTCS AND ThE CoNsTrunoN 512 (1953).
On the Emancipation Proclamation, see ANASTAPLO, supranote 14, at 197.
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However this may be, it was at roughly the midpoint of his already
notorious campaign against the gag rule in the House of Representatives
that John Quincy Adams became involved in the affair of the Amistad.
III.
Useful background for appreciating the discussion by Judge Hawkins
of the Amistad case is provided by this report:
The African slave trade depended on black Africans capturing
other black Africans and selling them to dealers on the coast for
shipment to plantations in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the
Americas. This is what happened to a group of Mende tribesmen
in West Africa in the spring of 1839. They were transported in a
Portuguese slaving vessel to Cuba, where fifty-three of them were
sold to two Spaniards who planned to carry them by sea in the
chartered ship Amistad for resale at Puerto Principe on the island's
northwest coast. But on the fourth night out one of the captives,
Joseph Cinqud, managed to get free of his manacles and unchain
the others. 9
The Hawkins account of the dramatic Amistad affair, about which even
an opera has been made in our time, begins thus:
Fifteen years after the decision in the-Antelope and two years into
the Van Buren Administration, another slave ship, L'Amistad
(ironically meaning "friendship"), was discovered by an American
revenue cutter off the American coast. A two-masted schooner,
sailing under the flag of Spain, Amistad had set out of Havana,
Cuba with approximately fifty-nine Africans in chains. But there
was a fundamental difference between Amistad and all the slave
ships that had preceded it: while at sea, the Africans aboard had
managed to free themselves. Months of captivity, starvation and the
slaughter of the weakest among them had set them in a blinding
rage. Free of their chains, they proceeded to murder nearly all the
ship's crew.2"

19. McKitrick, supra note 10, at 53. See infra the text accompanying note 42.
20. Hawkins, supra note 2, Section 14 ("The Amistad").
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It can be questioned whether these killings were indeed "murder."'"
What duty did these self-emancipated slaves owe to the Amistad crew
which had treated them in the brutal manner that they had, and upon whom
they could not rely to acquiesce in their own temporary restraint by their
former captives? Indeed, it eventually became evident that the survivors
among the whites on board the ship conspired to return "their" Africans to
slavery:
Two crew members, Jose Ruiz and Pedro Montes, were spared to
sail the vessel and the Africans home. Under the watchful but
untrained eyes of the Africans, Ruiz and Montes sailed to the East
in daylight, but in the opposite direction during the night. Ruiz and
Montes had prayed this zig-zag course would lead them to the
southern coast of the United States, but theAmistad wound up off
of Montauk Point, Long Island. On August 24, 1839, it was
boarded by men [from] the US.S.Washington.A shore party of the
Africans had also encountered a group of seamen from nearby Sag
Harbour... When [the American sailors] heard what Ruiz and
Montes had to say about the events at sea, the Africans were taken
into custody and transported to New Haven, Connecticut.'
Critical to the fate of these Africans was the claim made on their behalf in
Courts of the United States, and fairly easily established, that they had been
transported from the African coast quite recently--that is, decades after
both international law and the relevant treaty obligations forbade such
traffic in human beings by the parties involved.
Justice Joseph Story, who wrote the Opinion for the United States
Supreme Court in this case, identified the treaty obligations and related
issues to be considered here.
The main controversy is, whether these negroes are the property of
Ruiz and Montez, and ought to be delivered up ...It has been

argued on behalf of the United States, that the Court are bound to
deliver them up, according to the treaty of 1795, with Spain, which
has in this particular been continued in full force, by the treaty of
1819, ratified in 1821.... The ninth article provides, "that all ships
and merchandise, of what nature soever, which shall be rescued out
21. On "person" and "murder," see Appendix C of this Collection.
22. Hawkins, supra note 2, Section 14 ("The Amistad").
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of the hands of any pirates or robbers, on the high seas, shall be
brought into some port of either state, and shall be delivered to the
custody of the officers of that port, in order to be taken care of and
restored entire to the true proprietor, as soon as due and sufficient
proof shall be made concerning the property thereof." This is the
article on which the main reliance is placed on behalf of the United
States for the restitution of these negroes [to the true proprietors].'
It is one reminder of the gulf of experience and doctrine which separates us
from conscientious jurists of the mid-Nineteenth Century that they assume
there can be "true proprietors" of property in human beings, or slaves.
To bring the Amistad case within the article of the treaty identified by
Justice Story, it is (he says) essential to establish
First, That these negroes, under all the circumstances, fall within
the description of merchandise, in the sense of the treaty. Secondly,
That there has been a rescue of them on the high seas, out of the
hands of pirates and robbers; which, in the present case, can only
be, by showing that they themselves [these negroes] are pirates and
robbers; and, Thirdly, That Ruiz and Montez, the asserted
proprietors, are the true proprietors, and have established their title
by competent proof.24
The proof advanced here included documents prepared in Cuba which
purported to show that the Africans shipped in Cuba (and perhaps
elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere) from one slave market to another
were persons who had not been forced into slavery since the ban had been
placed decades earlier upon the importation of new slaves from Africa. It
was known, however, that false documents to this effect were routinely
available in Cuba-and John Quincy Adams and his associates were
indignant that the Government of the United States should have relied upon
such documents on this occasion, well knowing the practices of both the
authorities and of slave traders in Cuba and elsewhere.
Justice Story assesses in this fashion that "competent proof' offered on
behalf of the claimant Ruiz and Montes:
Ifthese negroes were, at the time, lawfully held as slaves under the
laws of Spain, and recognized by those laws as properly capable of
23. United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 592 (1841).
24. Id at 592-93.
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being lawfully bought and sold; we see no reason why they may
not justly be deemed within the intent of the treaty, to be included
under the denomination of merchandise, and, as such, ought to be
restored to the claimants: for, upon that point, the laws of Spain
would seem to furnish the proper rule of interpretation. But,
admitting this, it is clear, in our opinion, that neither of the other
essential facts and requisites has been established in proof; and the
onus probandi of both lies upon the claimants to give rise to the
causes foederis. It is plain beyond controversy, if we examine the
evidence, that these negroes never were the lawful slaves of Ruiz
or Montez or of any other Spanish subject2"
Instead, we are then told:
They are natives of Africa, and were kidnapped there, and were
unlawfully transported to Cuba, in violation of the laws and
treatises of Spain, and the most solemn edicts and declarations of
that government. By those laws, and treaties, and edicts, the
African slave trade is utterly abolished; the dealing in that trade is
deemed a heinous crime; and the negroes thereby introduced into
the dominions of Spain [which include Cuba], are declared to be
free. Ruiz and Montez are proved to have made the pretended
purchase of these negroes, with a full knowledge of all the
circumstances. And so cogent and irresistible is the evidence in this
respect, that the [United States] District Attorney has admitted in
open court, upon the record, that these negroes were native
Africans, and recently imported into Cuba, as alleged in their
answers to the libels in the case. The supposed proprietary interest
of Ruiz and Montez, is completely displaced, if we are at liberty to
look at the evidence of the admissions of the District Attorney.'
It can be suspected that if these Africans had been regarded as truly, or
fully, human by the Government of the United States, Ruiz and Montez
(instead of being supported in their claims) should have been threatened by
criminal actions for the perjury and fraud they engaged in and by civil
actions for the damage done by them to the Africans they claimed.

25. Id. at 593.
26. Id.
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The Opinion of the Court rounds off this part of its assessment with
these further observations:
If, then, these negroes are not slaves, but are kidnapped Africans,
who, by the laws of Spain itself, are entitled to their freedom, and
were kidnapped and illegally carried to Cuba, and illegally detained
and restrained on board of the Amistad, there is no pretence to say,
that they are pirates or robbers. We may lament the dreadful acts,
by which they asserted their liberty, and took possession of the
Amistad, and endeavoured to regain their native country; but they
cannot be deemed pirates or robbers in the sense of the law of
nations, or the treaty with Spain, or the laws of Spain itself; at least
so far as these laws have been brought to our knowledge?,
Even so, to call the acts of the Africans "dreadful" is not to regard them as
"murder." Dreadful acts may be sometimes required, or at least plausibly
justified, in efforts to revive liberty which has been improperly suppressed.
Is most, if not all, of modem slavery grounded in kidnapping or other
crimes? And if so, what "dreadful deeds" may not be justified in
endeavours to regain one's liberty? 8
Should not such questions remind us that Southerners, in the 1840s and
1850s, depended upon a species of property to which they were not
ultimately entitled and the presence of which left them highly vulnerable?
What, for example, might not a boatload of slaves shipped from, say,
Charleston to New Orleans, properly attempt to do to their "owners" on the
high seas? Should it matter to them whether their enslavement was recent
or generations-old in its origin? The ultimate absurdity, or irrationality, of
the property claimed in Africans as slaves is suggested by these and like
questions-as well as by the indignation aroused among those who believed
that Africans, however kidnapped and brutalized as slaves, were not entitled
to use the force and tactics that could properly be used by innocent whites
to recover their own liberty in comparable circumstances.29
27. Id. at 593-94.

28. It is here that a defense of John Brown's 1859 Harper's Ferry Raid could begin. See
14, at 362. See also the Epifogue to this Collection (drawing on
Frederick Douglass).
29. Compare the passage bitterly condemning the slave trade which was rejected by the
Continental Congress upon adopting the Declaration of Independence. See ANASTAPLO,
supranote 14, at 272-73 n. 44. See also supranote 11, and the text accompanying infranote
58 and the text accompanying infra note 113 in Appendix B of this Collection.
ANASTAPLO, supra note
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IV.
Adams's principal involvement in the Amistad case was evidently his
share in the oral argument on behalf of the Africans before the United
States Supreme Court. Nothing is said in the Opinion of the Supreme Court
about the matters that are distinctive to Adams's argument, as compared to
the argument made by his co-counsel. We do have the extended argument
that Adams published shortly after the case was disposed of by the Court,
but we cannot be sure that he had used any of that in his actual argument.
The Reporter of the decision does note that he did not have Adams's
argument in preparing his summary of arguments, adding that the Court's
decision had not depended on the Adams arguments. It seems, in any event,
that Adams prepared that extended argument for publication in an effort to
influence public opinion about the issues he discussed.
Much of what he does is to castigate the Government of the United
States, and especially the Secretary of State, for having taken the position
it did in support of the Spanish claimants. (Iwill say more about this soon.)
Related to this is Adams's analysis of the relevant treaty and statutory
provisions. These are, however, of secondary interest for us. Far more
important are the suggestions Adams makes about slavery and the
constitutional principles of the American regime.
At the heart of Adams's case against slavery, which case is made much
of in his constitutional and legal interpretations, are the pronouncements in
favor of liberty and equality in the Declaration of Independence. The
Declaration is drawn upon at least a half-dozen times in the course of
Adams's remarks, with several references made by him to the two copies
of the Declaration of Independence displayed in the Supreme Court's
chamber. It is the dependence upon the Declaration that helps Adams to
condemn slavery as he does, however much he considers himself obliged
to recognize the constitutional authority of the Slave States to retain and
protect their "peculiar institution."30
Adams recognized as well that the Government of the United States
lacks the authority, at least in ordinary circumstances, to interfere with
slavery in the States in which it had been legally established. But he could
still insist upon the right, if not also the duty, of the Government of the
30. Justice Story, inhis Opinion for the Supreme Court inAmistad, does not refer to the
Declaration of Independence. Was it considered too "political," and hence potentially
dangerous, to do so?
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United States to curtail the expansion of slavery and to prohibit (since
1808) the importation into the United States of any more slaves. It is that
prohibition, and related treaties and developments in international law with
respect to the international slave trade, which Adams considered the
Spanish diplomats and the Van Buren Administration to have attempted to
subvert.
The "created equal" language of the Declaration of Independence
obviously posed problems for anyone who attempted to justify an indefinite
continuation, to say nothing of a deliberate extension, of slavery. Adams
assumes throughout his Amistad argument that the Declaration is a
constitutional document.3 But it is elsewhere that we find what may have
been his most extended discourse on behalf of the constitutional stature of
the Declaration of Independence: this was in the address he gave on the
Jubilee of the Constitution, delivered in New York City on April 30, 1839,
the fiftieth anniversary of the Inauguration there of George Washington as
President of the United States.32
Not only does Adams insist in his 1839 address that the Declaration lies
at the foundations of the American regime, but he also considers the
Constitution of 1787 the natural implementation of the principles of the
Declaration. Thus, he explains, the dozen years of the American States
under the Articles of Confederation should be seen as an unfortunate
digression from the path laid down in the Declaration toward a proper
constitutional government for all of the people of the United States. It was
that united people, not the individual States or the peoples of the various
States, who had been responsible for the development and implementation
of the Constitution of 1787. Much the same is suggested by Abraham
Lincoln about the relation between the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution of 1787. 33

31. In support of this proposition, see FOUR PILLARS OF CONSTrroNALISM: THE
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNrTED STATES (Richard H. Cox ed., 1998). See also infra note 33.
32. This address, The Jubileeof the Constitutionmay be found, at among other places,
on the Internet (e.g., exLaw.com). Substantial excerpts from it may also be found in 6 THE
ANNALS OF AMERICA 471 (1976). A summary of The Jubileeis added to Appendix A of this
Collection.
33. On the significance of the Preamble to the Constitution, see Appendix A of this
Collection. See also Appendix D of this Collection. On Lincoln's Declaration of
Independence, see ANASTAPLO, supranote 14, at 11, 31, 363. These statements are central
to the American regime, especially in the hands of those who know when to remain silent.
See supra note 16. Compare Appendix B of this Collection.
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V.

Considerable passion is expressed by Adams in his Amistad argument
against what he regards as the gross improprieties of the Martin Van Buren
Administration in supporting the claims of the Spaniards seeking to recover
"their" Africans.'? Adams insists, here, upon the sovereignty of nations (and
even, it can seem, the prerogatives of individual States in the United States,
in opposition to the demands of the Spanish Government).
Adams is particularly scornful of the deference exhibited by the Van
Buren Secretary of State, John Forsyth, in complying with the improper
demands of the Spanish Government for the return to Cuba of the selfemancipated slaves. Indeed, the attacks by him upon the Secretary of State
can seem at times uncomfortably "personal," so much so that one can
wonder what accounted for the passion displayed in this form.
These attacks may reflect Adams's longstanding interest in how the
State Department conducted the business of the United States. After all, he
had not only served several years as Secretary of State, but he had been
before that in the diplomatic service of his country and after that Chairman
at times of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives.
But the passion exhibited here by Adams may be even more personal,
in that he may be implicitly commenting upon, and hence disavowing
(unconsciously, if not consciously), his own management of the Antelope
affair when he was himself Secretary of State. Certainly, he works hard in
hisAmistadargument to distinguish Antelope-but must he not have sensed
that he, in the Antelope crisis, like the Van Buren Administration in the
Amistad crisis, had been unduly concerned not to risk the political
consequences ofdisturbing Southerners sensitive to their slavery interests?
We can be reminded here of the reformed drunkard who is transformed into
a much-publicized star of the temperance movement."
We have noticed affinities between John Quincy Adams and Abraham
Lincoln, especially in their "theory" of the Constitution and in the
significance of the Declaration of Independence for that constitution. But
Lincoln, in his steady opposition to the extension and perpetuation of
34. Elsewhere Adams referred to Van Buren himself as aNorthern man with Southern
principles. On Van Buren, see supra note 7.
35. See, e.g., Hawkins, supranote 2, Section 18 ("The Amistad Arguments"). Consider,
also, Abraham Lincoln's Temperance Address of February 22, 1843. See, e.g., HARRY V.
JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED 236 (1959).
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slavery in the.Territories of the United States, never exhibits the sustained
passion that Adams does (in the closing decades of his life) against
slaveholders. In fact, Lincoln often observed that anti-slavery Northerners
would likely, in the circumstances of their Southern brothers, act as they
did. Adams himself does not face up to this kind of fact, however
uncomfortable he may have been with the (suppressed?) awareness that he,
as Secretary of State, had provided troublesome precedents for John
Forsyth and his associates. Thus, the way that Congressman Adams
conducted his campaign in the House of Representatives should be
contrasted with the far greater personal restraint exhibited by President
Lincoln in conducting his campaign for the Union. Adams did become
known as "Old Man Eloquent" for his vehement attacks upon slavery and
slaveholders, but despite the volumes of diaries he penned from his youth,
I do not believe he was ever capable of the kind of introspective
compassion evident in Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address. Was Adams
too "Roman" in this respect?36
VI.
The irrationality upon which the system of modem slavery depended,
and which it promoted, can be noticed wherever one probes into its
presuppositions and operations."' This may be seen in the brazenness of
governments in their willingness, well into the Nineteenth Century, to use
contrived documents to paper over the continuing kidnapping of Africans
from their native lands. It may also be seen in such measures as that
promoted by the trial court in the Antelope case, whereby it was initially
decreed that the sixteen Africans "entitled" to their immediate freedom (out
of the cargo of more than two hundred and fifty Africans) would be found
by lot. (The Almighty, it seems, was relied upon to guide the lottery.)"
The United States Supreme Court quietly set aside this device. But it is
worth considering what understanding of things could have led to such a
recourse to lots ever having been taken seriously (even by a member of the
United States Supreme Court sitting as Circuit Judge at the trial level in the
Antelope matter). Consider, for example, what would be said (then as well
36. On Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, see

ANASTAPLO,

supra note 14, at 243.

37. On governmental, and even communal, insanity, see supra note 9. Consider, as well,
the madness put on display in the 1945-1946 Nuremberg Trial. See George Anastaplo, On
Trial: Explorations, 22 Loy. U. CInc. L. J. 763, 977 (1991). On the rare natural slave, see
ANASTAPLO, supra note 14, at 257.
38.

See, e.g., Jonah 1:7; Joshua 7:14; ] Samuel 14:40-42; ] Samuel 10:21-21;Acts 1:26.
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as now) about any suggestion that a lottery be used in a murder trial to
identify the innocent in a consignment of prisoners among whom there are
known to be some guilty men who cannot be sorted out by relying only
upon the available evidence.
Such use of a lottery might sometimes be acceptable when properties
have to be allocated. But should the fate of human beings be decided thus?
Certainly, capital punishment could not be properly allocated thus in a
murder trial; but was not the allocation of someone to enslavement in the
1820s equivalent to capital punishment of the spirit? What we can see here,
as elsewhere in the system of slavery in North America, is the instinctive
refusal on the part of "the system" to regard people of African descent as
truly or fully human.39
The absurdities of the system go back to what routinely happened on
the coast of Africa: who was captured, by whom, and on what justification?
Judge Hawkins observes that even after the international slave trade had
begun to be condemned by treaties and international law, "as many as
50,000 Africans, each with as much legal claim to freedom as a resident of
London or Paris, were being kidnapped each year and brought to the
Americas." ° He also observes that "one of the most transparent aspects of
the antebellum maritime slave trade [was] the use of the flags of other
nations to cloak American involvement in an illegal and nasty enterprise."'
One reservation should be noticed, however, in response to any
suggestion that the men and women routinely being kidnapped on the West
Coast of Africa, decade after decade, had claims (legal or otherwise) to
freedom comparable to those of "a resident of London or Paris." That is,
genuine freedom depends upon conditions that evidently were not available
in much of Africa during the Nineteenth Century and before. Otherwise,
rapacious European and American slave traders could not have "depended
on black Africans capturing other black Africans and selling them to dealers
on the coast" for shipment as slaves to the Western Hemisphere.4 2
Of course, Africans were divided into distinctive tribes or peoples, so
that the selling that was done may not usually have been of one's "own."
But it should not have taken long for Africans to recognize that Africans,
of whatever tribe, were all quite different from the Europeans and
39. On Africans as "persons", see Appendix C of this Collection. See also infra note 43.
40. Hawkins, supra note 2, Section 4 ("Slavery After the Revolution").
41. Id. Section 7 ("La Jeune Eugenie').
42. See supra the text accompanying note 19. On freedom, see the materials collected
in the source book cited in supra note 1.
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Americans to whom the sales into slavery were being made. The civicmindedness, or distressing lack of it, displayed among Africans with power,
in cooperating with the slave trade (prior to and independent of
colonialization in many instances), may be seen in contemporary ruthless
exploitations of one African people after another by "their" rulers.43
Thus, the irrationality of the general system of African slavery in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries depended to a considerable extent
upon absurdities in the ways that some African leaders conducted
themselves." But however lamentable the greedy misconduct of African
suppliers of slaves, those suppliers could not have been as well informed as
their North American customers were about the dreadful consequences of
the enslavement to which they were contributing, beginning with the high
mortality rate ofthe Middle Passage. Nor did those suppliers purport, unlike
many of their ultimate American customers, to believe that "all Men are
created equal." The deepest irrationality, then, is to be seen in those who
make a mockery of what they purport to believe and upon which they
depend for their very existence as a community and as moral agents.
VII.
The Constitution was, for John Quincy Adams, not merely a compact
between sovereign States, but rather (as we have seen) part of the organic
law of the country ordained by the people of the United States. In this (we
have also seen) he anticipated Abraham Lincoln, as he did as well in
making as much as he did of the Declaration of Independence as a vital part
of the organic law of the United States.
Justice Story, in the Amistad case, had recourse to "the eternal
principles ofjustice and international law."4 This echoes what Adams had
argued, with priority by both of them assigned to "human life and human

43. On African life across millennia, see George Anastaplo, An Introduction to
"Ancient" African Thought, 1995 THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY 146 (1995) (to be included in
ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY: SEVEN INTRODUCTIONS TO NON-WESTERN THOUGHT

[forthcoming, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001]).
44. See also ISAIAH TRUNK, JUDENRAT: THE JEWISH COUNCILS
UNDER

NAZI OCCUPATION (1972);

DAN

COHN-SHERBOK,

IN EASTERN EUROPE

UNDERSTANDING THE

HOLOCAUST 162 (1999).
45.

United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 596 (1841).
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liberty."' TheAmistaddecision,by avirtually unanimous Court, repudiated
in effect what a sorely divided Court had done in the Antelope a generation
earlier (with Secretary Adams's support). The Africans in question were
ordered, in 1841, to be allowed to "go without day." This is to be contrasted
as well with what the "same" Court, again sorely divided, did sixteen years
later in the DredScott Case.!7
A persistent question throughout this period was what the principles of
the American system were and who could properly invoke them. However
much Adams had once considered himself obliged to accommodate himself
politically to Southern opinion, it seems that he knew better than he could
admit to the public at large. Thus, at the time of a Cabinet discussion (on
March 3, 1820) of the pending Missouri Bill in Congress, Adams records
in his Diary that he had insisted
The Declaration of Independence not only asserts the natural
equality of all men, and their inalienable right to liberty, but that
the only just powers of government are derived from the consent
of the governed. A power for one part of the people to make slaves
of the other can never be derived from consent, and is, therefore,
not a just power. 8
The Cabinet exchanges on this occasion included pro-slavery comments by
other cabinetmembers, including disparagements by them of the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, disparagements that Adams did not consider it useful
to contradict:

46. Justice Story dismissed the absurdity, perhaps required by the Spanish claimants'
position, of assuming that these Africans intended to import themselves as slaves. See id. at
596-97.
47. Another way of putting this difference is to suggest that the Amistad case was
decided in the spirit of Somerset, while the DredScott case was decided in the spirit of
Antelope. On Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772), see ANASTAPLO, supra
note 14, at 2, 369; I LIBERTY, EQUALrrY & MODERN CoNsTrrioNALisM supra note 1,
at 249. On Dred Scott, see ANASTAPLO, supra note 14, at 363.
48. V JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS: HIs DIARY FROM 1793 TO 1848, at 6 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.P. Lippincott & Co. 1875) [hereinafter ADAMS
MEMOIRS]. The Missouri Bill culminated in the Missouri Compromise of'1820, which
attempted to regulate the extension of slavery into the territories and thereafter in the new
States. On the Missouri Compromise, see Williams W. Wiecek, MissouriCompromise, III
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIoN, supra note 4, at 1268. See also JAFFA,
supra note 35, at 104; the first paragraph of the Washington Times book review reprinted
in the Epilogue of this Collection.
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I did not reply to the assertion that a solemn compact, announced
before heaven and earth in the Ordinance of 1787, a compact
laying the foundation of security to the most sacred rights of human
nature against the most odious of oppressions [by forbidding
slavery in the Northwest Territory], a compact solemnly renewed
by the Acts of Congress enabling the States of Ohio, Indiana, and
Illinois to form State Governments, and again by the acts for
admitting those States into the Union, was a nullity, which the
Legislatures of any of these States may at any time disregard and
trample under foot.49
It is evident from Adams's comments that he considered the Northwest
Ordinance to have been an official expression of the general antipathy
among the Founding Fathers against the extension of slavery into parts of
the United States in which it did not happen to be already deeply
entrenched. 0
Adams continues, in his March 3, 1820 entry, that it "was sickening to
[his] soul to hear the assertion [disparaging the Northwest Ordinance]; but
to have discussed it there would have been useless, and [would] only have
kindled in the bosom of the Executive [that is, in the Cabinet] the same
flame which had been raging in Congress and in the country."'" "Its
discussion," he added, "was unnecessary to the decision of the question
[about the Missouri Bill] proposed [to the Cabinet] by the President.""2
Even so, Adams believed it necessary to justify in Cabinet the continuing
relevance of the Northwest Ordinance in this fashion:
I therefore only said that the Ordinance of 1787 had been passed by
the old Congress of the Confederation without authority from the
States, but had been tacitly confirmed by the adoption of the
present Constitution, and the authority given in it to make needful
rules and regulations for the Territory. I added that in one of the
numbers of The Federalistthere was an admission that the old
Congress had passed the ordinance without authority under an

49. V ADAMS

MEMOIRS, supra note 48, at 7.
50. On the Northwest Ordinance, see ANASTAPLO, supra note 14, at 39, 367.
51. V ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 48, at 7.
52. Id.
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impulse of necessity; and that it was used as an argument in favor
of the enlarged powers granted to Congress in the Constitution.3
This extended account of the March 3 Cabinet meeting concludes with
Adams's observation that one of his colleagues "is already aware how his
canvass for the Presidency may be crossed by this slavery contest. The
violence of its operations upon his temper is such that he could not suppress
it."' Later that year, of course, Adams himself had to consider, in what he
said publicly about the Antelope matter, how his canvass for the Presidency
might be crossed by this slavery contest.
All this did not mean that Adams could not speak somewhat frankly in
private with his Southern friends, who seem to have included at this time,
John C. Calhoun, a fellow member of the Monroe Cabinet. 5 Consider, for
example, what happened immediately after the Cabinet meeting we have
just visited:
After this meeting, I walked home with Calhoun, who said that the
principles which I had avowed were just and noble; but that in the
Southern country, whenever they were mentioned, they were
always understood as applying only to white men. Domestic labor
was confined to the blacks, and such was the prejudice, that if he
[Calhoun], who\was the most popular man in his district, were to
keep a white servant in his house, his character and reputation
would be irretrievably ruined.
I said [to Calhoun] that this confounding of the ideas of
servitude and labor was one of the bad effects of slavery; but he
thought it attended with many excellent consequences. It did not
apply to all kinds of labor-not, for example, to farming. He
himself had often held the plough; so had his father.56
Manufacturing and mechanical labor was not degrading. It was
only manual labor-the proper work of slaves. No white person
would descend to that. And it was the best guarantee to equality
among the whites. It produced an unvarying level among them. It
53. Id
54. Id. at 10. This colleague, William Harris Crawford, was among those running for
the Presidency when Adams was elected in 1824. See COLE, supra note 7, at 116-41.
55. On Calhoun, see ANASTAPLO, supra note 14, at 113, 362.
56. The venerable precedent of Cincinnatus must have reassured Southern patricians
here.
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not only did not excite, but did not even admit of inequalities, by
57
which one white man could domineer over another.
Although Adams then says, "I told Calhoun I could not see things in the
same light," he is able to present the Calhoun doctrine in such a way as to.
suggest how Southerners (including the large majority who did not own
slaves) could be shaped and challenged by the system of slavery, a system
which somehow promoted heightened (if not even excessive) sentiments of
honor in the white community.
Adams continues his account, evidently recording now a series of
thoughts that he did not share with Calhoun but which reflected both the
Adams family heritage and his New England upbringing.
It [what Calhoun had been saying] is, in truth, all perverted
sentiment-mistaking labor for slavery, and dominion [over others]
for freedom. The discussion ofthis Missouri question has betrayed
the secret of their souls. In the abstract they admit that slavery is an
evil, they disclaim all participation in the introduction of it, and cast
it all upon the shoulders of our old Grandam Britain. But when
probed to the quick upon it, they show at the bottom of their souls
pride and vainglory in their condition of masterdom. They fancy
themselves more generous and noble-hearted, than the plain
freemen who labor for subsistence. They look down upon the
simplicity of a Yankee's manners, because he has no habit of
overbearing like theirs and cannot treat negroes like dogs."
It is understandable that the usefully cordial relations between Adams and
Calhoun could not have continued if Adams had said to his South
Carolinian colleague all that he thought on this occasion. This applies as
well to Adams's further silent probing of the Southern soul, pointing up
57. V ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 48, at 10. For a critical difference between equality
associated with absolutism and equality associated with liberty, see ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVoLUION 254 (Stuart Gilbert trans.,
1983). See also infra note 58.
58. V ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 48, at 10-11. See also supra note 29. Samuel

Johnson asked, "How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty from among the drivers
of negroes?" SAMUEL JOHNSON, TAXATION No TYRANNY, AN ANSWER TO THE
RESOLmONS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 89 (London 1774) (quoted in Hawkins, supra
note 2, Section 3 ("Slavery & American Independence"). Still, one may appreciate how
sweet liberty can be when one sees close at hand what slavery looks like. On Patrick Henry,
liberty, and slavery, see ANASTAPLO, supra note 14, at 358-59.
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thereby both the fundamental irrationality of slavery and the problems
confronted by those who acquiesced in it:
It is among the evils of slavery that it taints the very sources of
moral principle. It establishes false estimates of virtue and vice; for
what can be more false and heartless than this doctrine which
makes the first and holiest rights of humanity to depend upon the
color of the skin? It perverts human reason, and reduces man
endowed with logical powers to maintain that slavery is sanctioned
by the Christian religion, that slaves are happy and contented in
their condition, that between master and slave there are ties of
mutual attachment and affection, that the virtues of the master are
refined and exalted by the degradation of the slave; while at the
same time they vent execrations upon the slave-trade, curse Britain
for having given them slaves, burn at the stake negroes convicted
of crimes for the terror of the example, and writhe in agonies of
fear at the very mention of human rights as applicable to men of
color.5 9
Adams is then moved, perhaps not unnaturally, to wonder (again, silently)
whether the 1787 constitutional "bargain" with respect to slavery should
have been made:
The impression produced upon my mind by the progress of this
discussion [with Calhoun? or in the Cabinet also?] is, that the
bargain between freedom and slavery contained in the Constitution
of the United States is morally and politically vicious, inconsistent
with the principles upon which alone our Revolution can be
justified; cruel and oppressive, by riveting the chains of slavery, by
pledging the faith of freedom to maintain and perpetuate the
tyranny of the master; and grossly unequal and impolitic, by
admitting that slaves are at once enemies to be kept in subjection,
property to be secured or restored to their owners, and persons not
to be represented themselves, but for whom their masters are
privileged with nearly a double share of representation ....
It
would be no difficult matter to prove, by reviewing the history of
the Union under this Constitution, that almost everything which has
contributed to the honor and welfare of the nation has been
59. V ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 48, at I 1.
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accomplished in despite of them or forced upon them [the masters
of slaves], and that everything unpropitious and dishonorable,
including the blunders and follies of their adversaries, may be
traced to them. 60
This Diary entry of March 3, 1820 concludes with doubts about
whether the 1787 and subsequent accommodations to slavery should ever
have been made, New Englandish doubts which are expressed in a more
elegant form by Henry Thoreau in his 1849 essay on civil disobedience. 6
For Adams goes on to say:
I have favored this Missouri compromise [which had been
discussed that day in the Cabinet meeting], believing it to be all that
could be effected under the present Constitution, and from extreme
unwillingness to put the Union at hazard. But perhaps it would
have been a wiser as well as a bolder course to have persisted in the
restriction [with respect to slavery] upon Missouri, till it should
have terminated in a convention of the States to revise and amend
the Constitution. This would have produced a new Union of
thirteen or fourteen States unpolluted with slavery, with a great and
glorious object to effect, namely, that of rallying to their standard
the other States by the universal emancipation of their slaves. If the
Union must be dissolved, slavery is precisely the question upon
which it ought to break. For the present, however, this contest is
but asleep. 2

60. Id. at 11-12.
61. For reservations about Thoreau's celebrated Essay, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO,
HUMAN BEING AND CnrIZEN: ESSAYS ON VIRTUE, FREEDOM AND THE COMMON GOOD 203
(1975).
62. V ADAMS MEMOIRS, supranote 48, at 12. Charles Francis Adams, the editor of his
father's Diary, adds in a note at this point:
This sleep last about twenty-eight years. The writer [John Quincy Adams] was
sagacious enough to foresee that a compact resting upon no solid principles
either in morals or politics could not be permanent.... ITihe fearful problem
presented by [John Quincy] Adams has been solved, at a prodigious cost of
blood and treasure, without paying the penalty of the disruption of the Union,
which he held as inseparable from success.
Id. at 12 n.1.
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However significant the resemblances between John Quincy Adams and
Abraham Lincoln, it is here that a vital difference between them can again
be seen.63 For Lincoln came to insist-perhaps Adams would have done so
also in like circumstances?-that "slavery is precisely the question" upon
which the Union should not be allowed to be dissolved, especially after a
free and fair election had been held, pursuant to constitutional processes, in
which an explicit policy of no-expansion-of-slavery had been debated and
had prevailed at the polls.
Indeed, it can be suspected, the irrationality of slavery was such that not
only were its proponents almost certain to be deceived by the system (as
may be seen in the careers of Southerners as gifted as John C. Calhoun and
Alexander H. Stephens") but also that its opponents could be driven to
desperate and self-defeating measures in the effort to suppress a maddening
evil (as may be seen in the careers of Northerners as dedicated as Charles
Sumner and John Brown).6"
63. In these matters, it can seem, Adams is closer to Henry Thoreau while Lincoln is
closer to Daniel Webster. On Thoreau, see supra note 61. On Webster, see George
Anastaplo, American Constitutionalismandthe Virtue ofPrudence, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 106 (Leo Paul S. de
Alvarez ed., 1976); see also, ANASTAPLO, supra note 14, at 370.
64. On Alexander H. Stephens, see ANASTAPLO, supranote 14, at 121, 185, 309, 310.
65. On John Brown, see id. at 362; see also the Epilogue to this Collection. We can see
in Charles Sumner another Member of Congress who could attack slavery with the vigor of
the elderly John Quincy Adams (who died in 1848):
In 1841 Sumner won the Senate seat once held by Daniel Webster. In his first
speech, "Freedom National, Slavery Sectional," Sumner attacked the fugitive
slave law and congressional support of slavery for nearly four hours. In an 1856
speech, "The Crime Against Kansas," Sumner vilified senators who had
supported the Kansas-Nebraska Act. He described Stephen A. Douglas as "the
squire of slavery, its very Sancho Panza, ready to do all its humiliating offices."
South Carolina's Andrew Butler was, in Sumner's view, the Don Quixote of
slavery who had "chosen a mistress to whom he has made his vows, and who,
though ugly to others.., is chaste in his sight; I mean the harlot slavery." Two
days later Congressman Preston Brooks, a relative of Butler, repaid Sumner for
these remarks by beating him insensible with a cane. Many Northerners viewed
this incident as a symbol of a violent slavocracy which threatened the
Constitution and the nation. After a three-and-a-half year convalescence Sumner
returned to the Senate in 1860, renewing his crusade against bondage with a
four-hour oration, "The Barbarism of Slavery." This speech became a
Republican campaign document in 1860.
From the beginning of the Civil War Sumner urged the abolition of slavery. He
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These reminders of how even the best on all sides could miscalculate
and miscarry points up the remarkable talent, as well as the justified good
fortune, of a statesman such as Abraham Lincoln.
EPILOGUE

I have, over the years, indicated reservations about the uncompromising
positions against slavery in the United States taken by Henry Thoreau and
by John Quincy Adams in his old age. I prefer the prudential approach to
these matters of Abraham Lincoln and those of like mind, which deeply
political approach is to be preferred also to the States' Rightist positions
protecting slavery taken by John C. Calhoun and Stephen A. Douglas.
A critique of my longstanding approach-a vigorous critique from the
somewhat a-political Thoreau-Adams perspective-is suggested by a
generous reviewer of my 1999 book, Abraham Lincoln: A Constitutional
Biography. That challenging review (by Bruce Fein, in The Washington
Times, January 30, 2000, page B7) is set forth here in its entirety. I provide
thereafter a brief response, drawing upon what is said by me in Appendix
B and Appendix C of this Collection and elsewhere.
The complete Washington Times book review of January 30, 2000,
"The Heritage That Defined Equality," follows:
Suppose you are a slave in the Deep South in mid- 19th-century
America. The Wilmot Proviso that would prohibit slavery in
territory conquered during the Mexican-American War has been
defeated by Congress. The 1850 Compromise has added canine
teeth to the Fugitive Slave Act. The 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act has
superceded the Missouri Compromise of 1820 that carved out
territory sealed off from slavery.
The Democrat Party is ascendant, and Presidents Franklin
Pierce and James Buchanan have winked at the Democratic and
argued that secession was State Suicide, that the Confederate States had reverted
to territorial status, and that, despite the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
Congress had the power to end slavery in these Territories.
Paul Finkleman, Charles Sumner (1811-1874), in IV ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTTUTION, supra note 4, at 1809. We can hear, in this ingenious argument about the

seceding States' reversion to territorial status, the sort of argument that could also be made
on occasion by Sumner's fellow-Massachusetts-man, John Quincy Adams.
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violent outrages of pro-slavery forces in Bleeding Kansas.
Congress refused to end slavery in the District of Columbia, or to
ban the slave trade from the channels of interstate commerce. The
United States Supreme Court has declared that no black person,
enslaved or free, enjoys rights that a white man is required to
respect, and, that Congress lacks power to forbid slavery in
territories of the United States.
Do you possess a natural right to revolt against duly constituted
authorities under Abraham Lincoln's constitutional philosophy?
That is the type of gripping questions that recurs in the deftly
crafted collection of provocative essays by law professor George
Anastaplo in "Abraham Lincoln: A Constitutional Biography." The
book, nevertheless, also examines several cornerstones of our
constitutional dispensation and heritage, including the Declaration
of Independence, the constitutional convention, Alexis de
Tocqueville's "Democracy in America," and John Calhoun's
ferocious yet intellectually feeble defense of slavery, that are
peripheral to the author's analysis of Lincoln's thoughts and
actions.
The essays themselves enlighten regarding our constitutional
evolution and cultural underpinnings, for example, the shifting
balance between liberty and equality and the consequences for the
nation, its aspirations and achievements. Lincoln connoisseurs need
warning that their icon does not star in every chapter.
Generally speaking, Mr. Anastaplo, who is on the law faculty
at Loyola University of Chicago, acclaims the Founding Fathers
and Lincoln for their reason, prudence, and renunciation of
visionary politics that blighted the French Revolution. He dispels
any insinuation that they were sympathetic to slavery despite their
refusals to risk national martyrdom under an abolitionist banner a
la William Lloyd Garrison or John Brown. Slavery is either
expressly or tacitly condemned by the principles of the Declaration
of Independence, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the
Constitution itself in its verbal characterization of slaves as
"persons," not chattels.
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Let us return to the right of revolution postulated in the
Declaration of Independence, and to slaves. Mr. Anastaplo asks:
"Suppose one went as far as Lincoln did, including as he did
Africans among 'all Men.' Does it now follow, then, that the slaves
themselves were entitled, in the words of the Declaration of
Independence, 'to alter or abolish' - that is, to resist and replace
any form of government that denied them their 'unalienable
Rights' to 'Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness?"'
John Brown of Harper's Ferry fame bellowed "yes," but
Lincoln hedged. Mr. Anastaplo defends the Great Emancipator's
caution guided by countervailing concerns for domestic tranquility,
property rights, the Constitution, and Americans yet to be born
including the children and grandchildren of slaves. Rebellious
slaves and their sympathizers, according to Mr. Anastaplo, should
have been placated by Northern politicians rhetorically asking
them:
"Did not the best hope for the African slaves, once
they found themselves permanently in the United States,
lie in a gradual political resolution of the slavery issue, one
that permitted both the slaves and their masters to prepare
for general emancipation and eventual citizenship?"
The question, however, elides the slave viewpoint. Nowhere in
natural law or the Declaration is it suggested that the subjugated
should accept their subjugation, even for a lifetime, to enhance the
likelihood that future generations will enjoy a smooth transition to
liberty. Slaves were not saddled with a burden of political altruism.
Didn't Nat Turner have the right of revolution on his side in his
1831 slave revolt? Any idea of an impending emancipation would
have been a delusion.
The same bleak prospect persisted into the 1850s. The legal
and political signals, as noted previously, were overwhelmingly
negative.
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It would have been reasonable for slaves to assume that absent
revolt they would die in slavery. Why not fight for immediate
freedom, as the African National Congress did in South Africa to
end apartheid, a struggle crowned with success in 1994 with free
and fair elections - especially because the end of slavery at some
future time was no Euclidean certitude?
Mr. Anastaplo falsely likens gradual emancipation proponents
to American Statesmen who did business with the tyrannical Soviet
Union to avoid nuclear war. But the latter shared neither complicity
nor responsibility for Soviet oppression, while the former were
direct legal and moral participants in American slavery.
Maybe Lincoln's political prudence yielded a net gain in
morality and human happiness when the equation extends through
the long years of history, although adding and subtracting the lives
and joys of individuals seems beyond both science and intuition.
In sum, for all its occasional shbrtcomings, Mr. Anastaplo's
essay collection deserves the close attention of deep thinkers who
understand that political life comes much more in chiaroscuro than
in prime colors.
This Washington Times reviewer has put to me a question which can
help us think about how to apply universal principles to ever-changing
circumstances. The questions has been posed of what the invaluable right
of revolution should have meant to the men and women of African descent
held in slavery in the United States in the 1850s.
We can readily sympathize today with any slave who attempted to run
away to freedom, whatever the cruel necessities of the Fugitive Slave Law
and its enforcement may have been. But it seems to have been obvious to
most slaves in the 1850s, as well as to most of their champions, that
mounting an armed revolution at that time would have been a hopeless and
indeed suicidal undertaking.
Any politician who sympathized openly with efforts to promote slave
uprisings, such efforts as John Brown's spectacular 1859 Harper's Ferry
Raid, not only put in serious jeopardy those spirited slaves who might be
encouraged to join any uprising, but also crippled himself politically in the
ongoing campaign to contain and eventually to eliminate slavery in the
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United States. It is revealing that Frederick Douglass, a former slave
himself and perhaps the most eloquent abolitionist of his day, could (in
1859) both praise his friend John Brown as "noble and heroic" and yet
insist that "the taking of Harper's Ferry was a measure never encouraged
by my word or my vote, at any time or place."
Critical to how to regard any invocation of the right of revolution in
desperate circumstances is Douglass's 1859 pronouncement, "I am ever
ready to write, speak, publish, organize, combine, and even to conspire
against Slavery, when there is a reasonable hope of success." It is this
deeply prudential approach in combating the dreadful evils of Slavery that
probably contributed to the considerable respect for one another evidently
developed by Frederick Douglass and Abraham Lincoln during the Civil
War.
APPENDIX

A. THE PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES*

It has long been fashionable for judges and scholars to assume that the
Preamble to the Constitution of 1787 has no legal effect. It is even
dismissed by some as merely a flourish, adding little if anything to our
constitutional undertaking. But such a depreciation of the Preamble is not
supported by how it has been regarded by distinguished citizens at various
times in the history of the United States. In 1819, for example, the United
States Supreme Court (speaking in Mculloch v. Marylandthrough Chief
Justice John Marshall) looked to the Preamble for support of its holding that
the National Government should be paramount to State governments with
respect to matters about which the Constitution empowered the Congress
to legislate.
The most dramatic testimony to the importance and scope of the
Preamble may be seen in what Southerners considered it necessary to do in
1861 when they drafted a constitution for the Confederate States of
America. This was done at the outset of Southern effort to secede from the
Union after the 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency. The
1787 document provided the first draft for the constitution that the
Confederates prepared for themselves. This is the Preamble that they settled
upon, with my brackets indicating words deleted from the 1787 Preamble

* An encyclopedia entry prepared by George Anastaplo in 1997. It was published at

that time, but in a considerably edited form.
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in 1861 and my italics indicating words added to it at that time (we can
disregard here changes in capitalization and punctuation):
We the People of the [United] Confederate States, each State
actingin its sovereign and independentcharacter,in order to form
a [more perfect Union] permanentfederalgovernment, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, [provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare,] and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity - invoking the favor and
guidance of Almighty God - do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the [United ]Confederate States of America.
Thus, the Southerners added to their 1861 Preamble an invocation of
"the favor and guidance of Almighty God," perhaps sensing the divine
favor that they would need in order to carry off the radical dismemberment
of the Union that they were undertaking. The phrase "a more perfect
Union" is replaced by "a permanent federal government," emphasizing
thereby the States' Rights approach of the seceding States.
Also significant here are (1) their dilution of "We the People" by
insisting that each State acted "in its sovereign and independent character,"
and (2) their removal of the promotion of "the general Welfare" from the
ends of the government under the Constitution. (Provision for "the common
defence" is also removed from the Preamble, but it is retained in Article I,
Section 8 of the Confederate Constitution, while provision for the general
welfare is not. Perhaps "the common defence" was removed from the
Preamble because the use of "common" seemed to look more at the outset
to a Union than to a Confederation.) These 1861 changes in the 1787
Preamble anticipate that the powers of the government under the new
Confederate Constitution would be much more dependent upon the States,
with their overriding concern about and control of slavery, than the powers
of the government under the original United States Constitution had been,
where the People recognized by the Declaration of Independence had taken
charge of their affairs nationwide.
The changes recorded in the Confederate Constitution of 1861 remind
us of how troublesome and even dangerous the 1787 Preamble and its
Constitution had come to seem to the slavery-minded Southern States. The
complete defeat of the Confederacy in the Civil War left the Constitution
of 1787 reaffirmed, if not even strengthened, with the always divisive
institution of slavery abolished nationwide.
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Six ends of government are listed in the 1787 Preamble. The first and
last of these ends- "to form a more perfect Union... and [to] secure the
Blessing of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity"--can be understood to
be special to the new political order inaugurated by the Declaration of
Independence in 1776. The other four ends-to "establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
Welfare"-- had long been understood to be expected from any national
government which was to be taken seriously. It also seems to have been
understood in the Eighteenth Century that any ambiguity or uncertainty in
the body of a document such as the Constitution might be resolved by
looking to the objectives listed authoritatively in its preamble.
One consequence of elevating "We the People" to the head of the
Constitution of 1787 has been to make the People of the United States more
likely to regard themselves as one People entitled both to keep their
Country together and to sustain a National Government powerful enough
to serve the ends which are recognized, and are thereby legitimated, by the
Preamble of the Constitution of the United States."

** See, for further study ofthe Preamble: 1)WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 370f (1953); 2) GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION

OF 1787, at 13f (1989); 3) GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION 97f, 125f(1995). The authority of the People of the United States,

as evident in both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of 1787,
is emphasized by John Quincy Adams in his summary of The Jubilee of the
Constitution, his April 30, 1839 discourse on the constitutional history of the
United States since 1776. His summary reads:
It has been my purpose, Fellow-Citizens, in this discourse to show:
1.That this Union was formed by a spontaneous movement of the people of thirteen
English Colonies, all subjects of the King of Great Britain-bound to him in
allegiance, and to the British empire as their country. That the first object of this
Union, was united resistance against oppression, and to obtain from the government
of their country redress of their wrongs.
2. That failing in this object, their petitions having been spurned, and the oppressions
of which they complained, aggravated beyond endurance, their Delegates in Congress,
in

their

name

and

by their authority,

issued

the

Declaration

of

Independence-proclaiming them to the world as one people, absolving them from
their ties and oaths of allegiance to their king and country-renouncing that country;
declared the UNITED Colonies, Independent States, and announcing that this ONE
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PEOPLE ofthirteen united independent states, by that act, assumed among the powers
of the earth, that separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's
God entitled them.
3. That in justification of themselves for this act of transcendent power, they
proclaimed the principles upon which they held all lawful government upon earth to
be founded-which principles were, the natural, unalienable, imprescriptible rights of
man, specifying among them, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness-that the
institution of government is to secure to men in society the possession of those rights:
that the institution, dissolution, and reinstitution of government, belong exclusively
to THE PEOPLE under a moral responsibility to the Supreme Ruler of the universe;
and that all the just powers of government are derived from the consent of the
governed.
4. That under this proclamation of principles, the dissolution of allegiance to the
British king, and the compatriot connection with the people of the British empire,
were accomplished; and the onepeople of the United States of America, became one
separate sovereign independent power, assuming an equal station among the nations
of the earth.
5. That this one people did not immediately institute a government for themselves. But
instead of it, their delegates in Congress, by authority from their separate state
legislatures, without voice or consultation of the people, instituted a mere confederacy
[with the Articles of Confederation].
6. That this confederacy totally departed from the principles of the Declaration of
Independence, and substituted instead of the constituent power of the people, an
assumed sovereignty of each separate state, as the source of all its authority.
7. That as a primitive source of power, this separate state sovereignty, was not only
a departure from the principles of the Declaration of Independence, but directly
contrary to, and utterly incompatible with them.
8. That the tree was made known by its fruits. That after five years wasted in its
preparation, the confederation dragged out a miserable existence of eight years more,
and expired like a candle in the socket, having brought the union itself to the verge of
dissolution.
9. That the Constitution of the United States was a return of the principles of the
Declaration of Independence, and the exclusive constituent power of the people. That
it was the work of the ONE PEOPLE of the United States; and that those United
States, though doubled in numbers, still constitute as a nation, but ONE PEOPLE.
10. That this Constitution, making due allowance for the imperfections and errors
incident to all human affairs, has under all the vicissitudes and changes of war and
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APPENDIX B. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES*

The abuses by free-speaking citizens most likely to be seen in the
United States are in the exercise of rights that are clearly recognized as
protected. This emphasizes the duty of respectable citizens to choose with
care the occasions when acknowledged rights are to be exercised.
An appropriate caution is reflected in a comment by James Madison in
the First Congress. It had been suggested by a Member of the House of
Representatives that the Rhode Island legislature be requested to call a State
convention to consider ratifying the Constitution. The Member asked that
the House resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole to discuss this, a
request that aroused the opposition of Members who preferred not to
intrude themselves into this delicate matter even to that extent but preferred
rather to leave Rhode Island completely alone. Thus, Madison was obliged
to say,
I believe, Mr. Speaker, there are cases in which it is prudent to
avoid coming to a decision at all, and cases where it is desirable to
evade debate; if there were not cases of this kind, it would be
unnecessary to guard our discussions [by interposing] the previous
question. My idea on the subject now before the House is, that it

peace, been administered upon those same principles, during a career of fifty years.
11. That its fruits have been, still making allowance for human imperfection, a more
perfect union, established justice, domestic tranquility, provision for the common
defence, promotion of the general welfare, and the enjoyment of the blessings of
liberty by the constituent people, and their posterity to the present day.
* This Appendix is reprinted from GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONsTrrTIONALIsT:
NoTEs ON THE FiRST AMENDMENT ch. VIII, § xii, 239-53, 725-30 (1971) (with Notes 106-

12 1). The notes for this text are provided here as footnotes, using the original numbering of
the notes. In the notes from The Constitutionalistwhich follow (Notes 106-121), all
references to chapters and notes are, unless otherwise indicated, to notes elsewhere in The
Constitutionalist.

The Constitutionalistis scheduled to be republished in 2001 by Rowman & Littlefield.
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would be improper in this body to expose themselves to have such
a proposition rejected by the Legislature of the State of Rhode
Island. It would likewise be improper to express a desire on an
occasion where a free agency ought to be employed, which would
carry with it all the force of a command. How far this is
contemplated on the present occasion, I cannot tell; but I heartily
wish that as little may be said about it as possible. I conceive this
to be one of the cases to which the previous question is applicable;
and, if the gentleman means to call the House on a direct decision
on this motion, I shall step between, and interpose the previous
question. [Annals of Congress,vol. 1, p. 423]'°
Alexander White, expressing a different attitude about such matters, replied
(on another occasion) to an objection that a proposed discussion was on "a
subject of considerable delicacy" with the declaration, "As to delicacy, I
know of none, sir, that ought to be used while we are in pursuit of the
public good. I speak, therefore, with candor what are my sentiments on this
subject." Annals of Congress, vol. I, p. 633 (The subject on this later
occasion related to the salaries appropriate for the President and the VicePresident of the United States.).
Madison's position was stated, in a much more serious context, in the
words of President Abraham Lincoln in 1862: "If there ever could be a
proper time for mere catch arguments, that time surely is not now. In times
like the present, men should utter nothing for which they would not
willingly be responsible through time and in eternity." 7 These are not
judgments that can be determined by rules of law. Rather, the traditions and
good sense of a people and of their leaders must be relied upon. Critical to
such good sense is the ability to recognize when one's rights should be
foregone for the sake of a greater good than that which is implied in the
106. In this instance, the previous question was, "Shall the main question be now put?"
This was negated, thus shutting off further discussion of the Rhode Island proposal. See
Arthur E. Sutherland, Constitutionalism in America: Origin and Evolution of the
FundamentalIdeas (New York: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1965), p. 444.
107. Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, ed. John G. Nicolay and John Hay (New York:

Century Co., 1902), 2:274. Lincoln's care in the use of language is exhibited by the shift in
prepositions in his phrase, "through time and in eternity." Compare at p. 200, above, the
younger Lincoln. (Does not Hamlet, on the other hand, consider time to continue "through"
eternity? See pp. 30-31, above. Would the lack of change "in" eternity make the notion of
"eternal punishment" [say, of Claudius] unrealistic?) See chap. 9, n. 30, below. See, also,
Thomas Paine, Writings (New York : G.P. Putnam's sons, 1894), 2:277-79, 4:211.
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immediate preservation or exercise of particular constitutional rights. That
is, one is driven to consider and to respect the ends or purposes of freedom.
Perhaps the most important occasion on which this problem has been
raised for Americans was that of the abolitionist agitation in the second
quarter of the Nineteenth Century. An example in this connection is the
conduct in the House of Representatives of the elderly Johna Quincy Adams
(then a former President of the United States), when he (as a member of the
House from Massachusetts) attempted to lay before that body the
antislavery petitions supplied him for that purpose. It has been observed
that Adams said more on freedom of speech in the course of this struggle
than all of the United States Supreme Court cases for the first one hundred
years of this Republic." 8

108. John Paul Frank, Marble Palace; The Supreme Court in American Life (New York:
Knopf, 1958), p. 183. It would not be thought today that the refusal of the House to refer
certain petitions to committees would be inconsistent with the constitutional injunction
against abridging "the right of the people .... to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Congress is prohibited, however, from imposing limitations on the right of
petition (such as prescribing criminal liability for petitioners), whatever either House may
do in disposing of the petitions submitted to it.
Precisely what is included in the traditional "right of the people to assemble and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances," which is not included in "freedom of
speech, or of the press," is hard to say. But to have left this traditional formulation out of the
constitutional enumeration might have suggested that there is guaranteed something less
than there could have been. (CompareChap. 3, n. 11, above.)
The right of petition had been vital to the Colonists in their dealings with Great Britain.
("In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble
terms. Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury." U.S.,
Declaration of Independence.) Petitions had had, in English law, a privileged character, at
least compared with ordinary publications. (Compare chap. 5, n. 145, above.) They have
become less important in a regime which is as dependent as ours is on freedom of speech
and of the press. (Comparechap. 4, n. 105, above.) Are petitions more apt to be employed
today by citizens acting in their capacity as subjects rather than in their capacity as rulers?
(See chap. 5, nn. 92, 133, above. "The extraordinary tact and sure instinct of the Negro
protest has made it primarily a massive petition for the redress of grievances, a form of
political action, in the courts and in the streets." Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First
Amendment [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966], p. viii. This was said in
September, 1964.)
Congress, in any event, cannot interfere with the access the people have to the
Executive and to the Judiciary. (See, e.g., chap. 4, n. 83, above. See, also, chap. 4, nn. 87,
96, above.) No redress is guaranteed, but one has at least the satisfaction of having had one's
say, of having been heard:
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It has also been observed that Adams had "the instinct for the
jugular."1" That is, he had the capacity to discern and the will to attack the

Katherina:

Why, sir, I trust I may have leave to speak:
And speak I will; I am no child, no babe:
Your betters have endured me say my mind,
And if you cannot, best you stop your ears.
My tongue will tell the anger of my heart,
Or else my heart concealing it will break;
And rather than it shall, I will be free
Even to the uttermost, as I please, in words

William Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, act 4, sc. 3. (See chap. 8, n. 127, below.)
See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution,2: secs. 1893-96. See, also,Carl
J. Friedrich, ConstitutionalGovernment and Democracy: Theory and Practicein Europe
and America (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1950), p. 159, on "assembly"
having been broadened to include "association." (The right of petition and freedom of the
press seem to have been blended in a recent development noted in Parade, June 1, 1969,
p. 5:
Petitions are a traditional democratic means of voicing dissent. But buying
newspaper space at $5,000 and $10,000 a throw in The New York Times for that
purpose is not. In a recent issue of Science magazine Everett Carl Ladd Jr.,
director of the political data center at the University of Connecticut, gives some
facts about this new procedure. In 1953, a year with its fair share of political
controversy, not one issue of the Sunday New York Times contained a petition.
Last year the Sunday editions were jammed with paid petitions. Ladd reveals
that for the last four years the war in Viet Nam has been the major subject of
advertised protest, and that virtually all the mass-signature petitions have
opposed government policy....

Are not such advertisements a means of expressing dissent rather than voicing grievances?
See chap. 3, n. 22, chap. 5, n. 24, above.)
109. This was said of Adams and of Rufus Choate by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Mark DeW. Howe, ed., Holmes-Pollock Letters (Cambridge : Harvard University Press,
1946), p. 95. Choate himself had said, "John Quincy Adams had an instinct for the jugular
and the carotid artery, as unerring as that of any carnivorous animal." Gilbert J. Clark. ed.,
GreatSayings by Great Lawyers (Kansas City, Mo.: Vernon Law Book Co., 1926), p. 12.
One problem with "going for the jugular" is that men become desperate and even
irresponsible in defending the jugular. (See chap. 8, n. 118, below.)
One should not go for the jugular unless one is fairly sure it can be reached. (See chap.
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most vulnerable spot in the constitution of his opponents. The vulnerability
of the South with respect to the institution of slavery was exposed in 1835
by Tocqueville:
I am obliged to confess that I do not regard the abolition of
slavery as a means of warding off the struggle of the two races in
the Southern states. The Negroes may long remain slaves without
complaining; but if they are once raised to the level of freemen,
they will soon revolt at being deprived of almost all their civil
rights; and as they cannot become the equals of whites, they will
speedily show themselves as enemies. In the North everything
facilitated the emancipation of the slaves, and slavery was
abolished without rendering the free Negroes formidable, since
their number was too small for them ever to claim their rights. But
such is not the case in the South. The question of slavery was a
commercial and manufacturing question for the slave-owners in the
North; for those of the South it is a question of life and death. God
forbid that I should seek to justify the principle of Negro slavery,
as has been done by some American writers! I say only that all the
countries which formerly adopted that execrable principle are not
equally able to abandon it at the present time.
When I contemplate the condition of the South, I can discover
only two models of action for the white inhabitants of those States:

8, n. 80, above.)
[D]issenters frequently force the majority to take positions more extreme than
was originally intended. The classic example is the DredScott Case [19 How.
(U.S.) 393 (1856)], in which Chief Justice [Roger B.] Taney's extreme
statements were absent in his original draft and were inserted only after Mr.
Justice [John] McLean, then a more than passive candidate for the presidency,
raised the issue in dissent. [Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the
American System (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 19]
See chap. 2, n. 28, above.
Ralph Waldo Emerson spoke of John Quincy Adams as "a man of an audacious
independence that always kept the public curiosity alive in regard to what he might do. None
could predict his word, and a whole congress could not gainsay it when it was spoken." The
Complete Works ofRalph Waldo Emerson, ed. E.W. Emerson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1911), 11:521.
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namely, either to emancipate the Negroes and to intermingle with
them, or, remaining isolated from them, to keep them in slavery as
long as possible. All intermediate measures seem to me likely to
terminate, and that shortly, in the most horrible of civil wars and
perhaps in the extirpation of one or the other of the two races.
Such is the view that the Americans of the South take of the
question, and they act consistently with it. As they are determined
not to mingle with the Negroes, they refuse to emancipate them.
Not that the inhabitants of the South regard slavery as necessary
to the wealth of the planter; on this point many of them agree with
their Northern countrymen, in freely admitting that slavery is
prejudicial to their interests; but they are convinced that the
removal of this evil would imperil their own existence." 0
Such were the considerations that moved Lincoln to a charitable view of
where responsibility lay for the curse of slavery. Adams, on the other
hand-insofar as there is any indication in his Diary from which we can
reconstruct his approach to such problems-was armed with a terrible
righteousness.

110. Alexis deTocqueville, DemocracyIn America (New York: Random House, Vintage
Books, 1954), 1:394. See, also, ibid 1:418-19. See, on whether slavery was indeed
prejudicial to the economic interests of the Southern planter, Harry V. Jaffa, Crisisof the
House Divided(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1959), p. 396:
The thesis that slavery would not have gone into the territories, whether it was
prohibited by law or not, is the fundamental thesis of revisionism in dealing
with the political causes of the Civil War. But this thesis is itself a subordinate
manifestation of an apology for the South which has received a classic
formulation in the work of [Charles W.] Ramsdell [in "The Natural Limits of
Slavery Expansion," published in the MississippiValleyfHistoricalReview, Oct.

1929]. The main thesis of this apology ... is that slavery as an economic
institution had reached its peak in 1860 and was about to decline. Gradual
emancipation was "just around the corner," if only the Republicans had not
placed the South on the defensive. This contention has recently received its
most detailed and circumstantial refutation in a monograph written under the
auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research by two Harvard
economists, Professors Alfred H. Conrad and John Meyer. "The Economics of
Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South," published in The Journal of Political
Economy, April 1958, is the most enlightening piece of original research we
have encountered on the slavery question.
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The first Diaryreference to petitions goes back to 1805, before Adams
became President, while he was in the Senate:
Jan. 21-In Senate Dr. Logan presented the petition of certain
Quakers, requesting the interference of Congress as far as they
have power to check the slave trade. A question was made, whether
the petition should be received, and very warmly debated about
three hours; when it was taken by yeas and nays-yeas nineteen,
nays nine. [Diary,pp. 29-30] 1"
His entries during that year included a comment by Adams upon the House
of Representatives that came to be significant in the light of his own
experience in that House thirty years later:
March 3 ...Thus has terminated the second session of the Eighth
Congress; the most remarkable transaction of which has been the
trial of the impeachment against Samuel Chase [a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States]. This is a subject fruitful of
reflections, but their place is not here. I shall only remark that this
was a party prosecution, and has issued in the unexpected and total
disappointment of those by whom it was brought forward. It has
exhibited the Senate of the United States fulfilling the most
important purpose of its institution, by putting a check upon the
impetuous violence of the House of Representatives. It has proved
that a sense ofjustice is yet strong enough to overpower the furies
of faction; but it has, at the same time, shown the wisdom and
necessity of that provision in the Constitution which requires the
concurrence of two-thirds for conviction upon impeachment.
[Diary,p. 35]112
He added that "the essential characters which ought to belong to the Senate
are coolness and firmness."

11. The references to Diary in this section are to The Diary ofJohn Quincy Adams,
1794-1845, ed. Allan Nevins (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951).
Adams was President of the United States for one term, 1825-1829.
112. The House of Representatives brings the "indictment" (impeachment) before the
Senate, where the "trial" is held. See Federalist (New York: Random House, Modem
Library, n.d.), p. 424: "a method of national inquest into the conduct of men." See also,
chap. 7, n. 3, chap. 8, n. 43, above.
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Fifteen years later (1820) Adams was to record as his "own deliberate
opinion, that the more of pure moral principle is carried into the policy and
conduct of a Government the wiser and more profound will that policy be."
(Diary,p. 237) What "pure moral principle" consisted of will be seen in the
controversy about the abolitionist petitions. His uncompromising attitude
during that controversy is anticipated in his comments in an 1831 entry
about Thomas Jefferson:
In the evening I read a few pages of Jefferson's correspondence..
. .Mr. Jefferson's love of liberty was sincere and ardent-not
confined to himself, like that of most of his fellow slave-holders.
He was above that execrable sophistry of the South Carolina
nullifiers, which would make of slavery the comer-stone to the
temple of liberty. He saw the gross inconsistency between the
principles of the Declaration of Independence and the fact of Negro
slavery, and he could not, or would not, prostitute the faculties of
his mind to the vindication of that slavery which from his soul he
abhorred. Mr. Jefferson had not the spirit of martyrdom. He would
have introduced a flaming denunciation of slavery into the
Declaration of Independence, but the discretion of his colleagues
struck it out. He did insert a most eloquent and impassioned
argument against it in his Notes upon Virginia; but on that very
account the book was published almost against his will. [Diary,p.
3
412]'1

113. The more politically-minded Lincoln, on the other hand, spoke of Jefferson in this
manner (in 1854):
Mr. Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, and otherwise a
chief actor in the Revolution; then a delegate in Congress; afterward, twice
President; who was, is, and perhaps will continue to be, the most distinguished
politician of our history; a Virginian by birth and continued residence, and
withal a slaveholder-conceived the idea of taking that occasion to prevent
slavery from going into the Northwestern Territory. He prevailed on the
Virginia legislature to adopt his views, and to cede the Territory, making the
prohibition of slavery therein a condition of the deed. Congress accepted the
cession with the condition; and the first ordinance (which the acts of Congress
were then called) for the government of the Territory provided that slavery
should never be permitted therein. This is the famed "Ordinance of '87," so
often spoken of. Thenceforward for sixty-one years, and until, in 1848, the last
scrap of this Territory came into the Union as the State of Wisconsin, all parties
acted in quiet obedience to this ordinance. It is now what Jefferson foresaw and
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Unlike Jefferson, Adams did have "the spirit of martyrdom"--and this
suggests both the attractiveness of the Massachusetts-man and the
limitations of his political thought.
Adams, in his first term in the House of Representatives (he was then,
in 1832, sixty-four years old), recorded the procedure for handling
petitions:
Being Monday, the States were successively called for presentation
of petitions; a most tedious operation in the practice, though to a
reflecting mind a very striking exemplification of the magnificent
grandeur of this nation and of the sublime principles upon which
our Government is founded. The forms and proceedings of the
House, this calling over of States for petitions, the colossal emblem
of the union over the Speaker's chair, the historic Muse at the
clock, the echoing pillars of the hall, the tripping Mercuries who
bear the resolutions and amendments between the members and the
chair, the calls of ayes and noes, with the different intonations of
the answers from the different voices, the gobbling manner of the
clerk in the reading over the names, the tone of the Speaker in
announcing the vote, and the varied shades of pleasure and pain in
the countenances of the members on hearing it, would form a fine
subject for a descriptive poem. [Diary, p. 430]
He recorded as well his first presentation of abolitionist petitions:
Dec. 12 [1831] Attended the House of Representatives.... The
petitions were called for by States, commencing with Maine and
proceeding southward. 114 I presented fifteen petitions, signed
numerously by citizens of Pennsylvania, praying for the abolition
of slavery and the slave-trade in the District of Columbia. I moved

intended-the happy home of teeming millions of free, white, prosperous
people, and no slave among them. [Complete Works, 1:181-82]
Lincoln later corrected the statement that the prohibition was "a condition of the deed"
but his general appraisal of Jefferson's attitude and effort with respect to slavery remains and
invites comparison with Adams's. See Lincoln, Complete Works, 1:570-72.

114. This geographical sequence for "calling" the States is evident in the Declaration of
Independence and in the Constitution, and was used for many years thereafter until the
admission of many new States to the Union led (as it did in many other respects) to an
abandonment (after the Civil War) of the old way of doing things.
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that they should be referred to the Committee on the District of
Columbia.
The practice is for the member presenting the petition to move that
the reading of it be dispensed with, and that it be referred to the
appropriate, or to a select, committee; but I moved that one of the
petitions presented by me should be read, they being all of the same
tenor and very short. It was accordingly read. I made a very few
remarks, chiefly to declare that I should not support that part of the
petition, which prayed for the abolition of slavery in the District of
Columbia.... I was not more than five minutes upon my feet; but
I was listened to with great attention.... [Diary,pp. 426-27]
His self-restraint at this stage is reflected in an entry of the month
following:
Mr. Lewis is a member of the Society of Friends [the Quakers], and
has taken much part for the last twenty years in the measures
leading to the abolition of slavery. He came to have some
conversation with me upon the subject of slavery in the District of
Columbia. I asked him if he had seen the remarks that I made on
presenting the petitions from Pennsylvania. He said he had-but
wished to know my sentiments upon slavery. I told him I thought
they did not materially differ from his own; Iabhorred slavery, did
not suffer it in my family, and felt proud of belonging to the only
State in the Union which at the very first census of population in
1790 had returned in the column of slaves--none; l5 that in
presenting the petition I had expressed the wish that the subject
might not be discussed in the House, because I believed discussion
would lead to ill will, to heart-burnings, to mutual hatred, where the
first of wants was harmony; and without accomplishing anything
else. [Diary, pp. 429-30]
This was in 1832.
Disharmony did develop in the years that followed, however. Adams
wrote in 1835:

115. "They were anti-slavery by birth, as their name was Adams and their home was
Quincy." Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1918), p. 25.
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Aug. 11. There is a great fermentation upon this subject of slavery
at this time in all parts of the Union. The emancipation of the slaves
in the British West India Colonies; the Colonization Society here;
the current of public opinion running everywhere stronger and
stronger into democracy and popular supremacy contribute all to
shake the fetters of servitude. The theory of the rights of man has
taken deep root in the soil of civil society. It has allied itself with
the feelings of humanity and the precepts of Christian benevolence.
It has armed itself with the strength of organized associations. It
has linked itself with religious doctrines and religious fervor.
Antislavery associations are formed in this country and in England,
and they are already cooperating in concerted agency together.
They have raised funds to support and circulate inflammatory
newspapers and pamphlets gratuitously, and they send multitudes
of them into the Southern country, into the midst of the swarms of
slaves. There is an Englishman by the name of Thompson, lately
come over from England, who is traveling about the country,
holding meetings and making eloquent inflammatory harangues,
preaching the immediate abolition of slavery. The general
disposition of the people here is averse to these movements, and
Thompson has several times been routed by popular tumults. But
in some place he meets favorable reception and makes converts.
There has been recently an alarm of slave insurrection in the State
of Mississippi, and several white persons have been hung by a
summary process of what they call Lynch's law; that is, moblaw.... There are now calls [in the newspapers] at Boston for a
town-meeting to put down the abolitionists; but the disease is
deeper than can be healed by town-meeting resolutions.
Aug. 14. The accounts of the riots in Baltimore continue. In the
State of Mississippi mobs are hanging up blacks suspected of
insurgency, and whites suspected of abetting them. At Charleston,
South Carolina, mobs of slave-holding gentlemen intercept the
mails and take out from them all the inflammatory pamphlets
circulated by the abolitionists, who, in their turn, are making every
possible exertion to kindle the flame of insurrection among the
slaves. We are in a state of profound peace and over-pampered
with prosperity; yet the elements of exterminating war seem to be
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in vehement fermentation, and one can scarcely foresee to what it
will lead. [Diary, pp. 462-63]
This account, from a friend of freedom and a vigorous opponent of
slavery, suggests to me the conclusion that something ought to have been
done to suppress the agitation and calm the people, North and South. It
seems to have been assumed that the duty for moderating the conflict lay
with State governments and with private citizens; Congress had no power
with respect to such matters, at least short of the obligation to put down
insurrections and preserve republican government in the States.
The most that the House of Representatives could do, it tried to do, by
tabling the abolitionist petitions which it received. Such control Adams
interpreted as an abridgement of his and his constituents' constitutional
rights: when confronted by such a restraint, the high-spiritedcitizen is
tempted to press for his rights at all costs. Thus began for Adams a struggle
that was to last almost a decade, during which he was to record no more
sentiments suggesting the need for moderating "the elements of
exterminating war [which seem] to be in vehement fermentation." (Perhaps
no solution short of the abolition of slavery could have permanently
eliminated the conflict; but the foregoing of some rights by Northerners
and, one suspects, more respect by Southerners for the rights as well as the
sensibilities of others might well have kept men's minds clear.)
This struggle began with the New Year (1836) upon Adams's
presentation of a petition by 154 Massachusetts inhabitants "praying for the
abolition of slavery and the slave-trade in the District of Columbia." (Diary,
p. 464) Two weeks later, additional abolitionist petitions were presented by
him. (Diary,p.465) All such petitions were referred to a select committee
of the House, which submitted its report to the House on May 18, 1836.
This report declared, first, that Congress had no power to interfere with
slavery in any State; second, that Congress ought not to interfere with
slavery in the District of Columbia; and third, that since the agitation of the
topic was disquieting, all petitions or papers relating to slavery "shall,
without being either printed or referred, be laid upon the table, and that no
further action whatever shall be had thereon." All three resolutions were
passed over Adams's protest, the third by a vote of 117 to 68. And, the
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editor of the Adams diary adds, "Such was the origin of the famous gagrule." (Diary,pp. 465-66)"6

Adams records that this committee report was immediately attacked in
the House "with extreme violence, and a fiery debate arose, which
continued until one o'clock, and then, by a suspension of the rules, for
another half-hour." (Diary, p. 465) In the year that followed, Adams
attempted to present other abolitionist petitions, including some purporting
to come from slaves. This in turn led to an attempt on January 23, 1837, to
censure him in the House of Representatives. (Diary, p. 476) He had
occasion thereafter to record:
April 19 ....

Upon this subject of anti-slavery my principles and

my position make it necessary for me to be more circumspect in
my conduct than belongs to my nature. I have, therefore, already
committed indiscretions, of which all the political parties avail
themselves to proscribe me in the public opinion. The most
insignificant error of conduct in me at this time would be my
irredeemable ruin in this world, and both the ruling political parties
116. The effect of tabling such petitions was to shut off all debate respecting them. See
chap. 8, n. 106, above. See, for a Southerner's assessment of the seventy-year conflict of
which this gag-rule controversy was an episode, chap. 7, n. 95, above.
Robert Wain (of Pennsylvania) presented in the House of Representatives on
Jan. 2, 1800
a petition of Absalom Jones and others, free men of color, of the city and county
of Philadelphia, praying for a revision of the laws of the United States relative

to fugitives from justice; and for the adoption of such measures as shall in due
course emancipate the whole of their brethren from their present situation;
which he moved to have referred to the committee appointed to inquire whether
any and what alterations ought to be made in the existing law prohibiting the
slave trade from the United States to any foreign place or country. [Annals, VI,
p. 229]
The House voted, 85-1 (the one being George Thatcher of Massachusetts), that
the parts of the said petition which invite Congress to legislate upon subjects
from which the General Government in precluded by the Constitution, have a
tendency to create disquiet and jealousy, and ought therefore to receive no
encouragement or countenance from this House. [Annals, VI, p. 244]
See, also,Daniel Webster, Works (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1869), 3:279:82; Lincoln,
Works, 1:565; chap. 7, n. 14, above.
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are watching with intense anxiety for some overt act by me to set
the whole pack of their hireling presses upon me.
It is also to be considered that at this time the most dangerous of all the
subjects for public contention is the slavery question.... The exposure
through which I passed at the late session of Congress was greater than I
could have imagined possible; and, having escaped from that fiery furnace,
it behooves me well to consider my ways before I put myself in the way of
being cast into it again. [Diary, p. 479]
Nothing was said by Adams on this occasion about the desirability
(acknowledged thirty years earlier) of "putting a check upon the impetuous
violence of the House of Representatives." (Diary,p. 35) Rather, at the next
session, he returned to the battle. Ordinary petitions were received by the
House, but not those calling "for the abolition of slavery in the Territories;
for refusing the admission of any new slave-holding State into the Union;
and for the prohibition of the inter-State slave-trade." (Diary, p. 484)
During September, 1837, Adams presented several dozen more such
petitions, "reserv[ing] a considerable number for the winter session."
(Diary,p. 484) He presented even more slavery petitions in December, all
of which were tabled. One entry reflects the feeling of the time:
Dec. 20. Slade's motion of Monday, to refer a petition for the
abolition of slavery and the slave-trade in the District of Columbia
to a select committee, came up.
Polk, the Speaker, by some blunder had allowed Slade's
motion for leave to address the House in support of the petition
without putting the question of laying on the table. So Slade today
got the floor, and in a speech of two hours on slavery, shook the
very hall into convulsions. Wise, Legare, Rhett, Dawson,
Robertson, and the whole [pro-slavery] herd were in combustion.
Polk stopped him half a dozen times, and was forced to let him go
on. The slavers were at their wits' ends. At last one of them
objected to his proceeding, on the pretence that he was discussing
slavery in Virginia, and on this pretense, which was not true, Polk
ordered him to take his seat. [Diary,pp. 490-91]
The following day a resolution was moved (and carried 136 to 65), like that
of an earlier session, "that no petitions relating to slavery or the trade in
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slaves in any State, district, or Territory of the United States shall be read,
printed, committed, or in any manner acted upon by the House." (Diary,p.
491) Adams, when his name was called, responded, "I hold the resolution
to be a violation of the Constitution, of the right of petition of my
constituents, and of the people of the United States, and of my right to
freedom of speech as a member of this House." (Diary, p. 491) He also
recorded his exchange with a Southerner on the floor of the House the
following day:
.... I bantered him upon his resolution, till he said that if the
question ever came to the issue of war, the Southern people would
march into New England and conquer it. I said I had no doubt they
would if they could, and that it was what they were now struggling
for with all their might. [Diary, p. 492]
Adams's entries continued to record the conflict: "Jan. 15 [1838] ....
There
were a great multitude of abolition and anti-Texas petitions from all the free
States; all laid on the table. I presented nearly fifty myself." (Diary,p. 493)
The gag rule provoked further petitions, which poured in on Adams and his
supporters:
Jan. 28. I received this day thirty-one petitions, and consumed the
whole evening in assorting, filing, endorsing, and entering them on
my list, without completing the work. With these petitions I receive
many letters, which I have not time to answer. Most of them are so
flattering, and expressed in terms of such deep sensibility, that Iam
in imminent danger of being led by them into presumption and
puffed up with vanity. The abolition newspapers... contribute to
generate and nourish this delusion, which the treacherous, furious,
filthy, and threatening letters from the South on the same subject
cannot sufficiently counteract. My duty to defend the free
principles and institutions is clear; but the measures by which they
are to be defended are involved in thick darkness. The path of right
is narrow, and I have need of a perpetual control over passion.

[Diary,p. 493]
The "control over passion" evidently did not require, in his view, that he not
arouse the passion of others:
Feb. 14.... The call commenced with me, and I presented three
hundred and fifty petitions .... There was one, praying that
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Congress would take measures to protect citizens of the North
going to the South from danger to their lives. When the motion to
lay that on the table was made, I said that "in another part of the
Capitol it had been threatened that ifa Northern abolitionist should
go to North Carolina and utter a principle of the Declaration of
Independence-" Here a loud cry of "Order! Order!" burst forth,
in which the Speaker yelled among the loudest. I waited till it
subsided, and then resumed, "that if they could catch him they
would hang him." I said this so as to be distinctly heard throughout
the hall; the renewed deafening shout of "Order! Order!"
notwithstanding. The Speaker then said, "The gentleman from
Massachusetts will take his seat"; which I did, and immediately
rose again, and presented another petition. He did not dare to tell
me that I could not proceed without permission of the House; and
I proceeded. The threat to hang Northern abolitionists was uttered
by Preston, of the Senate, within the last fortnight. [Diary,pp. 49394]
The controversy raged through the year. On June 23, 1838, Adams was
"peremptorily stopped by the Speaker" for his "disorderly words" on
petitions. (Diary, p. 495) On December 14, he recorded his attempt to
protest the treatment of additional petitions:
.... When my name was called by the clerk, I rose and said, "Mr.

Speaker, considering all the resolutions introduced by the
gentleman from New Hampshire as-" The Speaker roared out,
"The gentleman from Massachusetts must answer aye or no, and
nothing else. Order!"
With a reinforced voice--"I refuse to answer because I consider all
the proceedings of the House as unconstitutional." While in a firm
and swelling voice I pronounced distinctly these words, the
Speaker and about two-thirds of the House cried, "Order! Order!"
till it became a perfect yell. I paused for a moment for it to cease,
and then said, "A direct violation of the Constitution of the United
States." While speaking these words with loud, distinct, and slow
articulation, the bawl of "Order! Order!" resounded again from
two-thirds of the House. The Speaker, with agonizing lungs,
screamed, "I call upon the House to support me in the execution of
my duty!" I then coolly resumed my seat. [Diary,p. 496]
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March 29 [1841] .... The world, the flesh, and all the devils in
hell are arrayed against any man who now in this North American
Union shall dare to join the standard of Almighty God to put down
the African slave-trade; and what can I, upon the verge of my
seventy-fourth birthday, with a shaking hand, a darkening eye, a
drowsy brain, and with all my faculties dropping from me one by
one, as the teeth are dropping from my head-what can I do for the
cause of God and man, for the program ofhuman emancipation, for
the suppression of the African slave-trade? Yet my conscience
presses me on; let me but die upon the breach. [Diary, p. 519]
Adams's censure by the House was attempted again in early 1842 upon his
presenting "a petition praying for the dissolution of the Union," a petition
which he himself did not endorse. (Diary, p. 533) A bitter struggle
followed, which Adams recorded thus:
Jan. 31. My occupations during the month have been confined
entirely to the business of the House, and for the last ten days to the
defense of myself against an extensive combination 'and
conspiracy, in and out of Congress, to crush the liberties of the free
people of this Union by disgracing me with a brand of censure and
displacing me from the chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
for my perseverance in presenting abolition petitions. I am in the
midst of that fiery ordeal, and day and night are absorbed in the
struggle to avert my ruin. God send me a good deliverance! [Diary,
pp. 535-36]
Deliverance came on February 7, on a vote of 106 to 93 to table the antiAdams censure motion. The end of the following year, however, found
Adams in even greater agony:
Dec. 21 [1843]. In the House, the life-and-death struggle for the
right of petition was resumed. The question of reception of the
petition from Illinois was laid on the table--98 to 80-after a long
and memorable debate. I then presented the resolves of the
Massachusetts Legislature of the 23rd of March, 1843, proposing
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, making the
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representation of the people in the House proportioned to the
numbers of free persons, and moved it should be read, printed, and
referred to a select committee of nine. And now sprung up the most
memorable debate ever entertained in the House .... [Diary, p.
561]
A Northern legislature was challenging, in the resolves presented by
Adams, the constitutional arrangement which permitted the Southern States
to count, for purposes of representation, three-fifths oftheir slaves. One can
imagine the agitation of the Southern members by observing Adams's:
"The crisis now requires of me coolness, firmness, prudence, moderation,
and fortitude beyond all former example. I came home in such a state of
agitation that I could do nothing but pace my chamber." (Diary, p. 562)
This petition was presented to a Select Committee, rather than tabled, but
not before one of the Southerners
called upon the reporters to take note of what he was about to say,
asked the particular attention of the House, and declared once for
all, and forever, that he renounced this WAR against Southern
rights which had been for several years waged in the hall. He
would vote for my motion to refer these resolves to a Select
Committee, and hoped I should be chairman of it, that the whole
committee should be of the same complexion, and that the whole
mass of abolition petitions should be referred to the same
committee, that we might make a report in our own way, and the
House and the country might see what we were after.... [Diary,
pp. 562-63]
The struggle continued, but with the majorities upholding the gag rule
steadily declining. In 1842 the supporters of the rule had a margin of only
four votes; in 1843, the margin was down to three. (Diary,p. 573) But then
occurred what Adams considered a disaster:
Quincy, Nov. 8 [1844].... James K. Polk of Tennessee [who had
been Speaker of the House of Representatives] is to be President of
the United States for four years from the 4th of March, 1845. What
the further events of this issue may be is not clear, but it will be the
signal for my retirement from public life. It is the victory of the
slavery element in the constitution of the United States.
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Providence, I trust, intends it for wise purposes and will direct it to
good ends. [Diary, p. 572]
Within a month Adams was back in Washington in the House of
Representatives, where the "good ends" he had prayed for were realized,
apparently because "the slavery element" could (upon having elected a
President) relax its vigilance:
Dec. 3 [1844].... In pursuance of the notice I had given yesterday,
I moved the following resolution: "Resolved, that the twenty-fifth
standing rule for conducting business in this House; in the
following words, 'No petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper
praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia or any
State or Territory, or the slave trade between the States or
Territories in which it now exists, shall be received by this House,
or entertained in any way whatever,' be, and the same is, hereby
rescinded." I called for the yeas and nays. Jacob Thompson of
Mississippi moved to lay the resolution on the table. I called for the
yeas and nays on that motion.... The clerk called the roll, and the
motion to lay on the table was rejected-81 to 104. The question
was then put on the resolution; and it was carried-108 to 80.
Blessed, forever blessed, be the name of God! [Diary,p. 573]
Adams's last significant diary entry related to the celebration of this
victory:
March 13 [1845]. At the Patent Office, I applied to the
Commissioner .... for the ivory cane made from a single tooth,
presented to me by Julius Pratt & Co. of Meriden, Conn., and
which on the 23rd of April last I deposited in the Patent Office.
There is in the top of the cane a golden eagle inlaid, bearing a scroll
with the motto "Right of Petition Triumphant" engraved upon it.
The donors requested of me that when the gag-rule should be
rescinded I would cause the date to be added to this motto; which
I promised to do, if the event should happen in my lifetime....
There is a gold ring immediately below the pommel of the cane,
thus engraved:
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TO JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
JUSTUM ET TENACEM PROPOSITI VIRUM

I crave pardon for the vanity of this memorial. [Diary, pp. 574-75]"I7
One must wonder, however, whether the true memorial, not only to
Adams but to all who contended with him (supporters and opponents alike)
on constitutional principles regardless of costs, was the Civil War of the
next generation."' The reader sensitive to moral and political realities is

117. The editor notes that from this date on the diary entries become increasingly
scattered and feeble. Adams continued to serve in the House until February 21, 1848, when
he was fatally stricken there. He died in the Capitol building on February 23 at the age of
eighty.
118. A comparable struggle in the Senate is reported in H. von Holst's John C. Calhoun,
American Statesmen Series (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1892), pp. 122-34. "[Calhoun]
shares with the abolitionists the merit of having always probed the wound to the bottom,
without heeding in the least the protesting shrieks of the patient." Id., p. 309. See chap. 8,
n. 109, above; see, also, chap. 7, n.95, above.
The two [hospitalized Civil War soldiers] were chatting of one thing and
another. The fever soldier spoke ofJohn C. Calhoun's monument, which he had
seen, and was describing it. The veteran said: "I have seen Calhoun's
monument. That which you saw is not the real monument. But I have seen it. It
is the desolated, ruined south; nearly the whole generation of young men
between seventeen and thirty destroyed or maim'd; all the old families used up
...all that is Calhoun's real monument." [The Portable Walt Whitman (New
York: Viking Press, 1945), p. 580]
See chap. 4, n. 10, above. ComparePaine, Writings, 1:177.
... As early as the 1820's the South Carolinian [Calhoun] had been increasingly
conscious of a change taking place in the equilibrium of the power structure of
the republic, a change harmful to the South. He sensed that some ingenuity was
called for to maintain the balance. He was a man of ingenious mind, and he built
upon the work of the Virginia dynasty. In the spirit of the Virginia and
Kentucky resolutions of 1798 he could advocate nullification .... [Roy F.
Nichols, Blueprint for Leviathan: American Style (New York: Atheneum,
1963), p. 133].
Daniel Webster, in his second reply to Senator Robert Young Hayne of South Carolina,
January 26, 1830, interpreted in this way the resolutions written by Madison for the Virginia
legislature:
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prompted to wonder thus when he reflects on the problems that are ignored
in Allan Nevins's editorial eulogy of this immoderately gallant former
President of the United States:
....

the most dramatic record of all is that of how, as an old man,

he met the forces of slavery in the gate, fought the Southern
advocates of the gag-rule from session to session, and, often beaten
but never despairing, after a decade of unremitting conflict won an
ever-memorable victory for the great Anglo-Saxon rights of free
petition and of free speech.
It was the happiest feature of Adams's public life that he lived to
taste the full sweets of this victory over those whom in his acrid
way he calls the slave-mongers, and to hear abolition petitions
again referred to committees in the House. It was a happy fact also
that he lived to make a tour of the West, in which he was able to
see how warm a place his brave fight for freedom had won him in
the hearts of the people of New York and Ohio." 9

I cannot undertake to say how these resolutions were understood by those who
passed them. Their language is not a little indefinite. In the case of the exercise
by Congress of a dangerous power not granted to them, the resolutions assert
the right, on the part of the State, to interfere and arrest the progress of the evil.
This is susceptible of more than one interpretation. It may mean no more than
that the States may interfere by complaint and remonstrance, or by proposing
to the people an alteration of the Federal Constitution. This would all be quite
unobjectionable. Or it may be that no more is meant than to assert the general
right of revolution, as against all governments, in cases of intolerable
oppression. This no one doubts, and this, in my opinion, is all that he who
framed the resolutions could have meant by it; for I shall not readily believe that
he was ever of opinion that a State, under the Constitution and in conformity
with it, could upon the ground of her own opinion of its unconstitutionality,
however clear and palpable she might think the case, annul a law of Congress,
so far as it should operate on herself, by her own legislative power. [Works,
3:332]
(See, for the opinion of John Taylor of Caroline, chap. 8, n.68, above. See, also,chap. 7, n.2,
above).
119. John Quincy Adams, Diary, pp. xv-xvi. Nevins's evaluation of Adams's career
seems to be that of most contemporary students. A reviewer of Samuel F. Bemis, John
Quincy Adams and the Union (New York: Knopf, 1916), wrote:

John Quincy Adams was an anomaly in American public life. A scholarly,
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truculent, suspicious, little man, he despised the ways of politics yet let the
politicians make him President. At a time when sectionalism was dominant, he
thought in terms of a national interest that transcended internal differences. In
an age of compromise, he remained inflexible. He came to the Presidency better
equipped by training and experience than any man before or since his time but
allowed his idealistic program to collapse because he would not deal with
political realities. Then, at the age of sixty-three, Adams entered the House of
Representatives, where he achieved the true greatness that was in him....
Bemis is at his best in the chapters dealing with the anti-slavery crusade, with
the long battle for the right of petition... but it was here that Adams himself
was at his best. . . . In the House of Representatives, he acknowledged
responsibility to no party or clique but only to his conscience. There his deep
moral fervor, his "compulsive genius for political contention," his vast learning,
the constantly whetted keenness of his mind, and the undiluted vitriol of his
tongue made him one of the most feared debaters in congressional history - a
fierce, unyielding champion of human freedom who could not be frightened, or
coerced, or silenced .... [Charles M. Wiltse, American HistoricalReview 61
(1955-56): 981-82]
Ralph Waldo Emerson said, in a talk at Concord in 1844 (Complete Works [Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911), 11:133-34):
Gentlemen, I am loath to say harsh things, and perhaps I know too little of
politics for the smallest weight to attach to any censure of mine, - but I am at
a loss how to characterize the tameness and silence of the two senators and the
ten representatives of the State [of Massachusetts] at Washington. To what
purpose have we clothed each of those representatives with the power of
seventy thousand persons, and each senator with near half a million, if they are
to sit dumb at their desks and see their constituents captured and sold; perhaps to gentlemen sitting by them in the hall?.... I may at well say, what all
men feel, that whilst our very amiable and very innocent representatives and
senators at Washington are accomplished lawyers and merchants, and very
eloquent at dinners and at caucuses, there is a disastrous want of men from New
England. I would gladly make exceptions, and you will not suffer me to forget
one eloquent old man, in whose veins the blood of Massachusetts rolls, and who
singly has defended the freedom of speech, and the rights of the free, against the
usurpation of the slave-holder. [Editorial note: John Quincy Adams, who,
though disapproving, as untimely, the legislation urged on Congress by the
abolitionists, yet fought strongly and persistently against the rules framed to
check their importunity, as inconsistent with the right of petition itself.] But the
reader of Congressional debates, in New England, is perplexed to see with what
admirable sweetness and patience the majority of the free States are schooled
and ridden by the minority of slave-holders.
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Many more such victories, the prudent man may observe, and constitutional
government is undone.
This story suggests to me that the most serious abuses of freedom of
speech and of the press among us are likely to occur in circumstances
where there is no safeguard but the good sense and self-restraint of the best
citizens, of men who know when and how to use delicacy while "in pursuit
of the public good."' 2 ° It is not enough to be right, in the strict constitutional
sense. Rather, the good man should be concerned lest he deserve the rebuke
that Cicero leveled against Cato-the rebuke with which Francis Bacon
concluded his interpretation of the story of Cassandra:
They say that Cassandra was beloved by Apollo; that she contrived
by various artifices to elude his desires, and yet to keep his hopes
alive until she had drawn from him the gift of divination; that she
had no sooner obtained this, which had all along been her object,
than she openly rejected his suit; whereupon he, not being
permitted to recall the boon once rashly promised, yet burning with
revenge, and not choosing to be the scorn of an artful woman,
annexed to it this penalty,-that though she should always foretell
true, yet nobody should believe her. Her prophecies therefore had
truth, but not credit: and so she found it ever after, even in regard
to the destruction of her country; of which she had given many
warnings, but could get nobody to listen to her or believe her.
This fable seems to have been devised in reproof of unreasonable
and unprofitable liberty in giving advice and admonition. For they
that are of a froward and rough disposition, and will not submit to
learn of Apollo, the god of harmony, how to observe time and
measure in affairs, flats and sharps (so to speak) in discourse, the
differences between the learned and the vulgar ear, and the times
when to speak and when to be silent; such persons, though they be
Compare Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press,
1958), p. 147; chap. 4, n. 117, above.
120. "But I must make it clear that I accept no fetters on my liberty of debate [in
Parliament] except those imposed by the rules of Order or by the public interest." Winston
S. Churchill, The End of the Beginning (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1943), p. 167. See
chap. 5, n. 124, above.
See Plato, Republic 536C.
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wise and free, and their counsels sound and wholesome, yet with
all their efforts to persuade they scarcely can do any good; on the
contrary, they rather hasten the destruction of those upon whom
they press their advice; and it is not till the evils they predicted
have come to pass that they are celebrated as prophets and men of
a far foresight. Of this we have an eminent example in Marcus
Cato of Utica, by whom the ruin of his country [Rome] and the
usurpation that followed, by means first ofthe conjunction and then
of the contention between Pompey and Caesar, was long before
foreseen as from a watchtower, and foretold as by an oracle; yet all
the while he did no good, but did harm rather, and brought the
calamities of his country faster on; as was wisely observed and
elegantly described by Marcus Cicero, when he said in a letter to
a friend, Cato means well: but he does hurt sometimes to the State;
for he talks as if he were in the republic of Plato and not in the
2
dregs of Romulus.1 1

121. The Works of FrancisBacon, ed. J. Spedding and R. Ellis (New York: Hurd &
Houghton, 1864), 13:83:84. Plutarch writes of Cato the Younger, The Lives of the Noble
Grecians and Romans (New York: Random House, Modem Library, n.d), pp. 896-97 (in
the translation of John Dryden):
His manners were little agreeable or acceptable to the people, and he received
very slender marks of their favour; witness his repulse when he sued for the
consulship, which he lost, as Cicero says, for acting rather like a citizen in
Plato's commonwealth, than among the dregs of Romulus's posterity, the same
thing happening to him, in my opinion, as we observe in fruits ripe before their
season, which we rather take pleasure in looking at and admiring than actually
use; so much was his old-fashioned virtue out of the present mode, among the
depraved customs which time and luxury had introduced, that it appeared,
indeed, remarkable and wonderful, but was too great and too good to suit the
present exigencies, being so out of all proportion to the times.
See Edmund Burke, Works, World Classics (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), 4:189.
Bacon's fable is found in his Wisdom of the Ancients, with the full title, "Cassandra;
or Plainness of Speech." (In the Latin original, the title is Cassandra,sive Parrhesia.See,
on parresia,chap. 9, n.9, below.)
It is impossible to imagine the scenes described by John Quincy Adams as taking place
either in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 or in the First Congress. Compare, in
Gouverneur Morris (A Diaryof the French Revolution, ed Beatrix C. Davenport [Boston;
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1939] 1:232, 382), his disapproving description of the proceedings
in the French Assembly during the Revolution. See, for a selection of extended comments
by Morris, pt. 2 of the lecture on the Constitution appended to my doctoral dissertation. See,
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APPENDIX C. THE PERSON IN ABORTION CASES AND IN A SLAVERY
SYSTEM*

INTRODUCTION

Pro-lifers today proudly identify themselves with the abolitionists of a
century and a half ago. Thus, they have seen in the toleration of abortion in
the late Twentieth Century much that resembles the disturbing toleration of
slavery in the early Nineteenth Century. There is something to this
identification, which testifies to the strengths as well as to the weaknesses
of both the abolitionist and the pro-life movements. A preliminary comment
upon this identification is implicit in the following observations about the
significance across centuries of the person in Anglo-American law.
I.
I have recently been asked, by a community leader here in Chicago, to
comment upon this proposition, "The United States Supreme Court ruled,
in Roe v. Wade, that a human fetus prior to birth is not a person in the
constitutional sense." This proposition invites both correction and
commentary.
First, the Supreme Court made no such ruling in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). Nor was the personhood of the human fetus, prior to birth,
addressed either by the concurring opinions, or by the dissenting opinions,
on that occasion. Rather, all nine Justices seemed to recognize that the
human fetus has long, if not always, been regarded in the Anglo-American
legal tradition as something other than a person. If the human fetus should
indeed be regarded as a person, it would be very difficult to justify one or
more of the exceptions permitted by most (but not by all) of those who
advocate the pre-1973 restraints in this country upon performing abortions.
Thus, even one of the dissenting Justices in Roe v. Wade assumed that no
State should be allowed to enforce an anti-abortion law which did not
permit an abortion (at any stage of the pregnancy?) when the life of the

on Gouverneur Morris, Paine, Writings, 3:152 ff., 180 if, 232.
See also, chap. 9, n. 7, below.
* A talk given by George Anastaplo to an alumni seminar of the Basic Program of
Liberal Education for Adults, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, June 5, 2000.
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woman carrying the fetus is endangered by her pregnancy. But if the human
fetus is truly, or fully, a person, could it ever be justly killed in order to save
the pregnant woman? Certainly, it is generally understood that the life of
one innocent person cannot be taken in order to save the life of another.
If the human fetus is not a person, then it is not accurate to speak, as
some do, of a fetus being "murdered" by the abortionist. If, however, the
fetus is a person, then the community probably has the duty to prevent
most, if not all, of the deliberate abortions we are now accustomed to. If,
again, the fetus is not a person, then how the community deals with the
treatment of fetuses by doctors and others is likely to become more
complicated. The fact that the fetus is not regarded as a person does not
mean that the State should have no authority to deal with what is done to or
with fetuses. The fetus is obviously a living thing-and there are many
living things, aside from human beings, which communities are expected
and empowered to regulate and protect. Various species of animals, of fish,
of birds, and of plants may be rigorously looked after by the community, as
may be of course many inanimate things, including rock formations, rivers,
and buildings.
II.

At the other constitutional extreme, so to speak, from the insistence that
the human fetus is a person is the insistence that such a fetus is left so much
in the control of the pregnant woman that the community should have no
legitimate say about how she deals with it. But it is not difficult to imagine
social and hence legal limitations that might properly be placed upon the
pregnant woman. The community, for example, might have a duty, as well
as the power, to interfere with practices by pregnant women, or by others
around them, which routinely damage (without aborting) fetuses, so much
so as to burden the community thereafter with permanently crippled
children. The community might even have the duty to interfere at a prior
stage, prescribing when or how or where a woman might be impregnated
and by whom. (We can be reminded here of, for example, laws forbidding
incest, the seduction of minors, and rape.) Thus, just as the human fetus is
not a person, always entitled to the protections that a human being is
routinely entitled to, so a woman is not a super-person, a virtually sovereign
individual who is beyond the reach of the community with respect to
anything she might choose to do (prior to a live birth) with her body and
hence with the fetus she happens to be carrying.
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I return to Roe v. Wade. The Supreme Court there, in the way it
regarded the human fetus, was very much in the Anglo-American legal
tradition. It is that tradition upon which I draw in this talk, leaving for
another occasion a discussion of the principles, authorities, facts and
arguments of those who sincerely believe that the human fetus is an
ensouled person from the moment of its conception. Although the AngloAmerican tradition does not work from this premise, it does not deny that
someone might be punished, or obliged to pay damages, for the harm
caused to a couple's fetus. This kind of liability, it should at once be added,
does not depend upon the fetus ever being considered a person, however
harsh the judicial treatment might be ofanyone who causes such harm. (The
refusal of Anglo-American law to designate the human fetus a person has
long been considered consistent, by the way, with legal arrangements which
can have fetuses designated as beneficiaries of designated property
interests, but such arrangements are usually contingent, for their realization,
upon live births.)
That the human fetus has not, in American constitutional history, been
regarded as a person is reflected in such facts as that fetuses are never
counted in the census required every ten years by the Constitution. Neither
potential human beings (that is, the fetus, no matter how near to delivery)
nor former human beings (that is the dead, no matter how recently alive) are
counted in compliance with the mandate (in Article I of the Constitution)
to determine the number of persons to which representation and taxation are
to be keyed.
III.
I have suggested that although the human fetus is not regarded as a
person in our constitutional tradition, the community may still do much to
regulate what is done among us to or with fetuses. On the other hand, our
experience with the decennial census should caution us against relying too
much or in a mechanical fashion upon the issue of personhood to settle
serious controversies among us. For the census provision in the
Constitution, already referred to, can help us notice that although human
fetuses are not regarded by the Constitution as persons, slaves certainly
were thus regarded so long as there were slaves in the United States. Threefifths of the slaves in this country were included by the Framers among the
persons to be counted toward the allocation of seats in the House of
Representatives. Nor should this Article I provision be taken to mean, as it
often is, that the slave was not regarded as fully or truly a person, but only
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as three-fifths of a person. Southern slaveholders were quite willing to have
their slaves, along with (as in the North) their non-voting women, children
and resident aliens, counted as full persons for representation purposes.
That slaves were regarded as persons may be seen elsewhere in the
Constitution as well. For example, the fugitive slave is referred to, in
Article IV of the document, as a person, one who is to be returned to the
labor sanctioned by the laws of the State from which he has fled.
These and like provisions meant, among other things, that although the
slave was a person, he could, depending upon how State laws were framed,
be routinely denied fundamental liberties. This seems to have been
consistent with the intentions and expectations of the Framers of the
Constitution, accommodating themselves thereby to an arrangement which
would encourage, perhaps even require, the eventual elimination of slavery
in the United States. That elimination was contributed to by the recognition,
in the Constitution as elsewhere, that the slave was truly a person. Thus,
since the slave was a person, and obviously so--that is, since he was no
doubt a human being-, challenges could properly be made to the laws, and
even more important to those underlying constitutional provisions, that
permitted the slave to be denied privileges and immunities, or the rights and
liberties, to which all human beings are believed to be naturally entitled in
ordinary circumstances. There has been, at least since Magna Carta, a
presumption in favor of liberty among the English-speaking peoples.
Indeed, the Southern States which attempted to secede from the Union, in
1860-1865, proclaimed themselves the champions of liberty even as they
insisted upon retaining slavery.
Be all this as it may, when a community is properly ordered, there are
apt to be few if any hereditary slaves. Perhaps, also, when human relations
are properly ordered, there are apt to be few if any abortions. Vital to such
proper ordering in both situations is an informed awareness in the
community of three questions: Who is truly a person? What are persons
obliged to do and not to do? How are persons generally entitled to be
treated? Perhaps the most difficult of these three questions to grasp today
is what it is that persons are obliged to do and not to do. It is here that our
most troublesome controversies-such as the civil rights controversy (a
legacy of our experience with slavery) and the abortion controversy (a
reflection of modern individualism)--may be usefully engaged.
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CONCLUSION

It should be evident from these observations that the critical questions

with respect to issues such as slavery and abortion are political and moral
questions, not primarily constitutional questions of the kind that courts can
reasonably be expected to settle. That is one of the lessons of the disastrous
ruling by the United States Supreme Court in DredScott v. Sandford, 60

U.S. (19 Howard) 393 (1837). Abraham Lincoln, however much he
respected and even drew upon the anti-slavery principles of the antebellum
abolitionists, believed that their passion had to be disciplined by political
requirements if slavery was indeed to be contained in the Territories of the
United States and eventually eliminated in the South. Pro-choice citizens
are eminently useful today, not least in that they remind the community at
large that there are standards by which the laws, as well as the opinions, of
the day may be judged and corrected. Certainly, such citizens are entitled,
if not even obliged, to help us all examine the constitutional doctrines which
courts presume to pronounce, whether the courts are like the DredScott
Court in 1857 or are like the Roe v. Wade Court in 1973.
APPENDIX D. CONVENTIONS, REASON AND AUTHORITY*
It is easy to feel pride and satisfaction in one's own things, so hard
to make sure that one is right in feeling it! -Matthew Arnold i

It is perhaps providential that this Caxton Club dinner meeting,
dedicated this month to the memory of your esteemed member, Elmer
Gertz,i should happen to fall at Midsummer's Night's Eve. This is a holiday
that is most familiar to us because of Shakespeare's play, a play in which
Puck, also known as Robin Goodfellow, is put to work by his sovereign in
the Wood.

* A talk given by George Anastaplo to the Caxton Club, Chicago, Illinois, June 21,
2000. The other speakers on this program were Harry Mark Petrakis, a Greek-American
story-teller, and Paul Simon, former United States Senator from Illinois.
i. MATmEW ARNOLD, ESSAYS IN CRITICIsM, SEcoND SERIES 127 (1924).
ii. See, e.g., Eric Pace, Elmer Gertz, a Top Lawyer, is Dead at 93, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2000, at C 10; Maura Kelly, 400 honor life, ideals of Elmer Gertz, Cm. TRIB., May 2,
2000, § 2, at 6.
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I say "providential" because Elmer Gertz was Puckish in more ways
than one, including in his effervescence, if not also in his physical
appearance. Had he taken to the stage, Puck surely would have been one of
his favorite parts. And in the Wood of Life, especially in the law courts, he
was an ever-active servant of his sovereign, which could be not only his
clients but even more the law and the community which the law serves.
But, we recall from Shakespeare's play, that things can go wrong when
Puck is put to work, especially when his sovereign, Oberon, either is unduly
moved by passions or is imprecise in the directives he lays down.
Sovereigns, it is salutary to be reminded, sometimes do not know what they
are doing or even what they are asking for.
The opinions of a sovereign--of the community at large--often appear
in the form of the conventions of the day. Those conventions do have to be
challenged from time to time, including (in Elmer's Gertz's experience)
conventions about acceptable literary publications, about prison practices
and expectations, about capital punishment, and about constitutional
arrangements. We all know, of course, of the services he rendered to the
likes of Henry Miller, Nathan Leopold, Jack Ruby, and Illinois
constitutionalists.m In the course of these campaigns, he also struck a blow
for personal privacy which netted him a handsome libel-suit award and,
through it, a much-enjoyed deluxe cruise around the world with his lively
wife.iv
It is prudent to notice, upon surveying the accomplishments of the
campaigning Gertz, that he was not simply a professional iconoclast. That
is, there were standards in the light of which he selected his causes,
standards which reflected his ultimate grounding in a lifelong respect for
proper authority, beginning of course with his deeprooted allegiance to
Judaism. v Otherwise, he would have been like various prominent lawyers
we know whose guiding principle sometimes seems to be notoriety,
preferably a profitable notoriety, without much effective concern for guilt,
innocence, or the common good.

iii. See, e.g., ELMER GERTZ, A HANDFUL OF CLIENTS (1965). See also George
Anastaplo, The PublicInterest in Privacy,26 DEPAuL L. REv. 767, 805-06 n.52 (1977).
iv. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); ELMER GERTZ, GERTZ V.
ROBERT WELCH, INC.: THE STORY OF A LANDMARK LIBEL CASE (1992).
v. See, e.g., Leo Strauss, Why We Remain Jews, in JEWISH PHILOSOPHY AND THE

CRISIS OF MODERNITY 311 (Kenneth Hart Green ed., 1997). On legal education and the
Bible, see George Anastaplo, Law & Literatureandthe Bible: Explorations,23 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 515 (1998).
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Particularly instructive here is what Elmer Gertz said about the Jack
Ruby case, that 1966 case which led him to study with some care the
assassination of President Kennedy as well as the shooting of Lee Harvey
Oswald. Our Chicago lawyer, as many of you know, did not become
professionally involved in these matters until Ruby had been sentenced to
death in a Texas court. This acknowledged killer of Oswald himself died in
January 1967, evidently of natural causes, not long after his conviction had
been vacated and while awaiting a new trial. The principal issue that the
Gertz team planned to develop was whether the defendant had been of
sound enough mind to warrant a death sentence for what he had obviously
done, in full view of a nationwide television audience. The Gertz approach
to this matter is reflected in the title he gave to the book he wrote about all
this, Moment of Madness."
The most valuable part of this big book is its championing of common
sense in helping the public think about the Kennedy-Oswald-Ruby
entanglement, perhaps the Bermuda Triangle of American public life, at
least in our time. It has now been more than thirty years since Moment of
Madness was published-and nothing substantial has emerged since then
to require the intelligent reader to accept an account of those terrible 1963
Dallas killings that is significantly different from the more or less orthodox
account we have had for decades, the account presented in the Gertz book:
to wit, the President was killed by a lone assassin, acting on his own, who
was killed in turn by a lone gunman, again acting on his own, a gunman
who often carried a pistol, who was known to be quite impulsive, and who
readily moved in and out of Dallas police circles.
It is possible, of course, that evidence may yet be unearthed which
exposes an elaborate assassination plot as well as extensive coverup
measures (which included the gunning down of an innocent suspect by a
hitman who was in turn ruthlessly done away with while he was held in
jail). What would such evidence of a plot, if truly persuasive, really prove?
Only that one of the literally hundreds, if not thousands, of quite fanciful
conspiracy theories and other wild speculations by which we are routinely
threatened and hence entertained-only that one of these speculations had
actually won the Fantasy Lottery. Thus, it is possible that one can, on rare
occasions, be "proven" correct about something that one had never been

vi. ELMER GERTZ, MOMENTOF MADNESS: THE PEOPLE vs. JACK RuBY (1968). On the

"state of excitement" that a murder case can provoke, see ABRAHAM LINCOLN, ICOLLECTED
WORKs 254, 371 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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justified in believing-that one had been no more justified in believing than
are those hundreds (if not thousands) of people justified in believing, for
example, that they have been personally abducted into spaceships or
wherever and then returned to their everyday lives by aliens from outer
space. '
It should have long been obvious that immense fortunes are to be made
by anyone who has access to experience with massive coverups-and there
would have to be many with such experience if the speculations by which
we are barraged have any merit. Men and women run great risks to make
far less money than would be available to anyone who comes forward with
credible evidence about the more spectacular coverups which have been
alleged over the decades, beginning with, say, the "Roswell" phenomena.
And yet such evidence has not been forthcoming-which may be evidence
for some truly cosmic conspiracy which is virtually impossible to fathom.
Unfortunately, comfortable (if not immense) fortunes can also be made
developing and retailing exciting allegations, however flimsy the evidence
available to support them has to be. The mass media, as we all know, are
always desperate for something "new," even if it is really more of "the
same old thing" and thus destined to engage us for only a brief span on each
occasion. The irresponsibility of the purveyors here, who can include
respectable mass media executives, should be obvious, not least when they
themselves are gullible.
Fundamental to our situation these days is the problem of the status of
authority itself, a problem which has been worsened by such disturbances
as our decade-long involvement in Indochina, our addiction to Cold War
fantasies, and our dependence upon political leaders who turned out to be

vii. Indeed, it might even be argued, in support of such claims by returned abductees,
that the temperament and the mode of argument of those who report these experiences testify
to the judgment of those "aliens" who have done the abducting: that is, it is the sensible
abductees that they have evidently kept. See "Scientific Integrity, UFOs, and the Spirit of
the Law," in George Anastaplo, Lessons for the Student of Law: The Oklahoma Lectures,
20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 19, app. at 187 (1995). See also Alessandra Stanley, 3rd Secret
of Fatima is Revealed by Vatican, CHi. TRm., May 14, 2000, § 1,at 3 (distributed by the
New York Times News Service); Henry Chu, Fascinationwith ParanormalSweeps All
Walks of Life in China,CI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 2000, at A- 18; Antony Barnett, Britain'sUFO
Secrets Revealed, LONDON OBSERVER, June 4, 2000, at 18; Patricia Cohen, From UF.O.
Dreams to FederalSchemes, He Debunks Them All, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2000, at AI5.
George Bernard Shaw observed, a century ago, that "modern populations are so vast that
even the most uncommon things are recorded once a week or oftener." GEORGE BERNARD
SHAW, III COMPLETE PLAYS WrrH PREFACES lii (1963).
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not as trustworthy as we had allowed ourselves to believe. Elmer Gertz,
whatever the conventions that he was obliged, if not even eager, to
challenge from time to time, retained a deep-seated respect for
authority-for the principles and institutions upon which this country must
depend. He did not permit himself to become as apprehensive of
government or as suspicious of official pronouncements as it has long been
fashionable to be.
The contemporary suspicion ofauthority includes determined resistance
among us to any communal efforts to shape and thereafter to preserve the
character of the people of this country. This has gone so far that even
lawyers, our anointed ministers of public rationality, can no longer be
counted on to respect either the authority of reason or the protocols of
institutions that have been rationally developed in the interest of justice.
The habitual responses of not a few lawyers these days take two forms,
either a thoughtless resistance to all constituted authority or, in an effort to
establish their own authority, a recourse themselves to power instead of to
reason. In the process, lawyers become thoroughgoing, and consequently
irresponsible if not even cynical, skeptics. But it is aptly noticed, in the
Moment ofMadness book, that "it is as much a form of gullibility to believe
nothing as it is to believe everything."'

viii. GERTz, supra note vi, at 540 (quoting Hugh Kingsmill). On the lawyer's duty in this
kind of case, see id.at 127-28. On the Kennedy Assassination generally, see George
Anastaplo, Human Nature and the First Amendment, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 661, 702-05
(1979). Consider, also, the following set of observations I made in 1974:
I should notice that many Europeans are even more skeptical than some
Americans are about the official accounts of the Kennedy assassination. I recall
being met at a Paris airport the summer after the assassination by an experienced
Chicago criminal lawyer, of liberal (if not even radical) inclinations-a lawyer
who had been in Paris for a year. The first thing I asked him was, "Who killed
President Kennedy?" "Oswald, of course," he replied. And he let me know, in
response to my questions, he did not see any connection between Mr. Ruby and
Mr. Oswald. I then asked, "Is this what you have learned from the Paris
newspapers?" "No," he replied, "but they have never been in an American
police station. I have and I know what can go on there!"
Thus, Mr. Ruby's moment of madness need not be seen as part of a conspiracy
in order to be understood. Indeed, is it not a distortion of reality to have
recourse to conspiracy theories to understand such things?
Id.at 704-05. See Mike Doming, US. Report Debunks [Martin Luther] King Conspiracies,
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The middle course between these two extremes-the extreme of
mindless negativity and the extreme of ruthless power-plays-the middle
course is that steered by Elmer Gertz, almost instinctively, it could
sometimes seem. We can be reminded, by his long career of enlightened
public service, of an observation made by Matthew Arnold a century and
a half ago,
The world is forwarded by having its attention fixed on the best
things ....A nation ...is furthered by recognition of its real gifts

and successes; it is [thus] encouraged to develop them further.
CHI. TRIB., June 10, 2000, § 1, at 3. See also Harrison Sheppard, American Law & the Past,
Present,and the Future of the American Regime (to be published in INTERPRETATION, Fall

2000).
ix. ARNOLD, supra note i, at 127. The term "recognition" in this quotation from
Matthew Arnold depends upon proper observation and sensible interpretation of that which
is observed. This dependence is drawn upon in the following Letter to the Editor that I sent
to the New York Times on April 1, 2000 (a letter which was not published):
Your correspondent (April 3, 2000) is right to remind us "that people who
choose to use tobacco products are doing so with full knowledge of the
consequences." He insists that smokers should not "be absolved of taking
responsibility for their own actions." What should be said, then, about the
"responsibility" for the "actions" of those who produce and market obviously
harmful products, year after year, "with full knowledge of the consequences"?
That is, should only those addicted to nicotine, and not those addicted to
substantial profits, be expected to pay for the considerable damage done because
of tobacco?
Such suggestions as these can be offered as contributions to enlightened public service. The
ultimate authority invoked here may be that of the common good or, in the words of the
United States Constitution, the general welfare. The potency of this authority is
acknowledged by the determination of the framers in 1861 of the Confederate Constitution
to remove "the general Welfare" both from the Preamble and from Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution. See GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS To THE CONsTITuTION 195
(1995). See also Appendix A of this Collection.
We return here to the Four Causes of this Collection's Prologue by illustrating "the
different ways in which something can be said to be responsible for something else":
...
Aristotle

does not deviate [here] from the Socratic-Platonic path. There are
different meanings attached to the question "Why?" and, correspondingly, there
are different ways of answering the question, "Why is this lectern such as it is?"
We might answer: "because of the wood, the particular material out of which
it is made." We might also say: "because the particular carpenter, the maker,
made it this way." We might also say: "because of the shape or look the maker
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It is fitting and proper, therefore, that your Club, with its determined respect
for fine books, should celebrate Elmer Gertz's patriotic career as you do
this auspicious evening.
The volumes you cherish tend to be those old books whose intrinsic
quality is such that considerable resources could be devoted over the
centuries to their creation, publication and preservation. No doubt, chance
can affect what happens to be printed and preserved-but there is still the
dominant sense among you that there are in the world fine publications
which can be identified as such (if only for the craftsmanship in their
production), things which are worthy of enduing respect. Even worthier of
respect, of course, are lives well-lived by those who truly know what they
are doing, especially as they stoutly challenge conventions when it is indeed
their duty to do so, but without mindlessly repudiating in the process all
legitimate authority.

had in mind." We might finally say: "because of the purpose this thing is
supposed to serve." However important and even indispensable the first three
answers might be, it is not difficult to agree that the choice of the material, the
shape or looks of the thing, and the performance of the maker who initiated the
transformation of the material into the lectern all depend on the purpose, the end
for the sake of which the lectern has been made. It is that purpose which is
decisively responsible for the lectern being as it is. Its purpose, its end, is its
true "beginning."...
Jacob Klein, LECTURES AND ESSAYS 192 (1985) (the Greek terms have been omitted). On
the Four Causes, see also Joe Sachs, ARISTOTLE'S "PHYSICS": A GUIDED STUDY 257 (1995);
Book Review, 26 INTERPRETATION 275 (1999).
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